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Abstract 
With the increase in soybean adoption in western Canada, accompanied by the lack of 
private soybean breeding, begs the question whether the levy funded Saskatchewan Pulse 
Growers (SPG) should invest in a producer-controlled breeding program at the Crop 
Development Center (CDC). SPG has very successful breeding programs with other pulse crops, 
but with soybeans, the decision to invest has unidentified economic impacts due to the potential 
private involvement. 
This thesis examines the crowding effects and welfare effects from the SPG investing in a 
soybean breeding program in western Canada. The thesis presents three models of strategic 
investment and entry to analyze private incentives to invest in soybean breeding and the effects 
of breeding investment on welfare. Players for each game include the Saskatchewan Pulse 
Growers (SPG) and private soybean seed companies located in western Canada. 
The first model is an extensive form game where SPG’s decision to investment is 
followed by the private firm. This model examines the potential holdup problem in soybean 
breeding in western Canada, which can exist if a private firm expects ex post entry by SPG. The 
extensive form game shows that the private firm has an incentive to invest when the threat of 
SPG entry is low, and/or their payoff increases because of SPG entry. SPG does not deter private 
entry when they credibly select traits that do not compete with the private firm, or traits that 
result in large research spillovers from SPG to the private firm.  
The second model is a two-stage game for investment in soybean breeding. This model 
examines how the degree of substitutability and the difference in the level of existing seed 
technology impact private profits, farmer welfare, and social welfare. In the first stage of the 
game, SPG and the private firm set their level of investment. The second stage of the game each 
player sets their level of quantity. Results of the two-stage game show that the private firm is 
crowded out when SPG invests in biotech traits and has a competitive level of existing seed 
technology. SPG can reduce crowding effects by either investing less prior to entry, which 
lowers their level of existing seed technology, or by selecting food edible traits that are less 
substitutable with private firm soybean varieties. 
 The third model is a simulation model. The simulation model estimates the impact 
investment in soybean breeding has on economic surplus in western Canada for 20 years. The 
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simulation model quantifies these effects using a new production function, data on yield, acres, 
costs, and acreage elasticities. The simulation model also quantifies how the degree of 
substitutability impacts the net present value of private profits, farmer welfare, and social 
welfare. The results of the simulation model are consistent with the two-stage game in that 
increased substitutability lowers a private firm’s incentive to invest in soybean breeding. 
However, SPG can reduce crowding effects by either selecting traits that are less substitutable 
with private soybeans, increasing their price of seed, and/or lowering their level of investment.  
SPG’s decision to invest in a soybean breeding program has the potential to provide 
farmers in western Canada with a maximum net present value benefit of 9 billion dollars over 
twenty years. However, outcomes that benefit farmers the most are likely to crowd out any 
significant private investment. The consensus of the three models is that SPG has breeding and 
pricing options that will limit the detrimental effect on private investment in soybean breeding 
while still increasing farmer welfare in western Canada. However, any option to reduce 
crowding effects of SPG comes at a cost of farmer welfare.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.0 Motivation 
In Canada, soybean adoption has been rapidly increasing. More specifically, soybean 
production in Manitoba and Saskatchewan has increased by 1.9 million acres in the past five 
years from 2013 where 1.2 million acres were seeded (Statistics Canada, 2017a). Soybeans are 
becoming a major crop in Canada’s agricultural sector, they are grown in both Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and the southern regions of Ontario and Quebec. This is shown in figure 1.0. 
Figure 1.0: Soybean Production in Metric Tonnes by Province in Canada (1980-2017)a 
 
Source: Statistics Canada (2017a) 
a CANSIM Table 001-0017 
 In Saskatchewan, maturity plays a key role in the producer’s decision to adopt soybeans. 
The short growing season in the prairies has a negative impact on yield, which makes growing 
soybeans a risky choice for farmers. Research projects funded by the public sector and producer-
controlled organizations seek to improve the maturity of soybean varieties grown in western 
Canada. Genetic research has identified eight earliness loci that affect maturity and flowering 
(Cober and Morrison, 2010). Current research at Soyagen Genome Canada builds on this 
research improving the yield and disease resistance for early maturing soybean varieties 
(Richardson, 2017). If successful, these varieties will be better suited for northern climates, 
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provided that the shorter photoperiod sensitivity would reach full maturity in Saskatchewan 
(Richardson, 2017).  
Despite the recent industry growth and the potential for future growth based on better 
genetics, there are no public or private soybean breeding programs located in western Canada. 
This lack of investment will limit yield improvement making it more difficult for farmers to 
capitalize on the rotational and agronomic benefits in growing soybeans. It is also important in 
the adoption process that farmers have adequate knowledge on new varieties with better genetics 
and higher yield (Richardson, 2017). Providing growers with new varieties is important, 
however, information on how to grow varieties that are well suited for northern climates is an 
important feat in successfully marketing this innovative seed technology. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
In western Canada, breeder seed for soybeans originates from breeding labs in Glyndon 
Minnesota, Grand Forks North Dakota, Ottawa Ontario and Arva Ontario (Heal, 2017; Lee, 
2017). Currently, there are no breeding programs in western Canada even with the significant 
growth in seeded acres. The Crop Development Center (CDC) and SPG have the option to create 
a joint venture that invests in a soybean breeding program and distribution channels to market 
seed royalty free to farmers across the prairies. 
Growers in western Canada have adopted private soybean varieties and depend on the 
private market to invest and develop better varieties. Despite the private market’s presence in the 
seed market, they have no soybean breeders in western Canada (Mascarenhas, 2017). They also 
charge a high price for soybean seed (Basol, and Lenssen, 2012; Heal, 2017), which limits 
adoption and grower returns. 
 Given the industry’s current reliance on the private seed industry, SPG must consider the 
crowding effects of any investment strategy. In eastern Canada, both private and public firms 
take part in funding soybean breeding programs (Soy 20/20, 2013). Public firms such as 
Agriculture and Agri Food Canada (AAFC) invest in breeding conventional soybeans, while 
private firms breed both biotech and conventional varieties (Soy 20/20, 2013). If SPG decides to 
invest in a breeding program at the CDC, the crowding effects could have negative implications 
on economic welfare in western Canada. 
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1.3 Goal and Objectives 
The goal of this thesis is to examine the economic impact of SPG investing in a soybean 
breeding program in western Canada. More specifically, this thesis examines the impact SPG 
investment has on economic welfare and potential crowding effects. This thesis uses three 
models to examine crowding and welfare effects. Three models are needed to understand the 
change in investment strategies when firms consider specific factors and criterion for entry in 
soybean breeding. The extensive form game examines how investment and entry decisions 
change with a holdup problem and spillover effects. The two-stage game is needed to understand 
how substitutability and the existing level of seed technology impact investment decisions. This 
game examines the crowding effects and welfare implications from SPG and private investment 
in soybean breeding under different levels of substitutability and existing seed technology. The 
third model, simulation model, examines how investment decisions change under the net present 
value investment criterion. The simulation model uses data to estimate the long-term economic 
impacts and crowding effects over 20 years of breeding investment. Results from each model 
provide important policy implications for investment and entry decisions in soybean breeding. 
These three models contrast each other in showing that different criterion for investment and 
entry lead to various welfare implications. 
1.4 Thesis Overview and Organization  
The organization of the thesis now follows from chapter 2 to 6. Chapter 2, Background, 
covers topics related to the northward genetic advancement of soybeans, the Saskatchewan Pulse 
Growers, and funding mechanisms for soybean breeding. The background also discusses 
measures of market failures in breeding; the role of public and producer funded breeders play in 
addressing market failures; crowding in and out; and the role of cooperatives in innovation. 
Chapter 3, Theoretical Model of Strategic Investment and Entry, explains the methodology in 
extensive form game theory and presents a simple game of entry in soybean breeding. Chapter 4, 
The Two-Stage Game, examines the crowding effects between SPG and private investment in 
soybean breeding. This chapter also examines how SPG’s trait selection can limit the crowding 
out of private investment. Chapter 5, Simulation Model, quantifies the long-term impacts of 
breeding investment over 20 years. The model uses data on yield, acres, price, costs, and 
elasticities to estimate private profits, farmer welfare and social welfare. This chapter uses a 
sensitivity analysis to examine how substitutability, spillover effects, price, and investment 
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impact SPG and private market investment decisions. Chapter 6, Conclusions, provides a thesis 
summary, policy implications, research limitations and further research.  
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Chapter 2 Background 
2.0 Soybean Production and Genetic Advancement Northward 
Today, the major soybean exporters in the world include the United States, Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Canada. Figures 2.0 and 2.1 shows soybean production 
within these countries from 1991 to 2014. Notably, soybean production has increased in northern 
latitudinal countries, such as Canada, the United States and countries within Europe. 
In Canada, public institutions like Genome Canada fund projects in which their research 
goal is sequencing genomes for several species. The Soyagen project is funded by Genome 
Canada and focuses on sequencing the soybean genome. This project involves deep probing into 
genetics and identifies DNA markers that control maturity and resistance to disease (Genome 
Canada, 2015). The Soyagen team is using these markers to develop new soybean varieties that 
are more suitable to western Canada’s shorter growing season. 
Figure 2.0: Total Soybean Production in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina (1991-
2014)a 
 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2016) 
a A production unit is in Million Metric Tonnes (MMT) 
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Figure 2.1: Total Soybean Production in the Paraguay, Uruguay, and Canada (1991-2014)a 
 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2016) 
a A production unit is in Million Metric Tonnes (MMT) 
 Current soybean breeding is largely focused on increasing maturity, protein content, and 
yield (Soy Canada, 2016a). This goal is difficult due to the tradeoffs between maturity, yield and 
protein. Genetics advancements in soybean breeding have been able to reduce these tradeoffs, 
but at a marginal rate. 
 In western Canada, maturity is a significant yield limiting factor that occurs in both wet 
and dry years. The private industry currently has 24 short-season soybean varieties available to 
producers in Saskatchewan, however, there remains to be no dedicated breeding program for 
soybeans in western Canada (Richardson, 2017). The market incentive to develop better short-
season soybean varieties is to increase the tonnage of soybeans crushed (Soy Canada, 2016a). 
However, the yield for these varieties is deemed to be much lower than later maturing varieties. 
 Figure 2.2 shows the yield for soybeans in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, and 
Saskatchewan. Ontario and Quebec have greater yields when compared to Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan because of its longer maturing season. However, soybean yields in Manitoba have 
been trending upwards since 2001. 
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Figure 2.2: Annual Average Yield of Soybeans in Ontario, Quebeca, Manitoba, and 
Saskatchewanb 
  
Source: Statistics Canada (2017a; 2017b) 
a CANSIM Table 001-0072 
b CANSIM Table 001-0017 
Because of the required earlier and shorter flowering period for soybeans at higher 
latitudes, genetic differences can be identified spatially amongst different varieties. Figure 5 
explains that the yield potential for longer-maturing soybeans in lower latitudes is much greater 
than the yield potential of shorter-maturing soybeans at higher latitudes. Soybean yield in 
Ontario and North Dakota can reach 60 bushels per acre while yields in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan range up to 40 bushels per acre in trials. The trendline in figure 2.3 shows the 
relationship between yield and latitude, which is negative. Current research in soybean breeding 
aims to increase the yield of shorter-maturing varieties and flatten the slope of this trendline. 
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Figure 2.3: Roundup Ready Soybean Yield Potential for Varieties in Triala,b,c with respect 
to Latituded 
Source: Adapted from Manitoba Pulse and Soybean Growers (2016a) North Dakota State 
University (2016), Ontario Soybean and Canola Committee (2016). Sask Seed Guide (2017). 
a Trails for Ontario are from the Ontario Soybean and Canola Committee’s RR Performance in Ontario Study 
b Trails in North Dakota are from the NDSU combined RR soybean fee test 
c Manitoba and Saskatchewan trials are from the pulse and soybean variety evaluation guide and seed guide 
d Latitudes are based on the location of trial site 
2.1 Saskatchewan Pulse Growers 
The Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (SPG) Development Board is a levy-funded producer-
controlled organization formed in 1983 that exists to support research and development in 
Saskatchewan (Saskatchewan Pulse Growers, 2016a). Through the AgriFood Act, SPG claims a 
1% levy from pulse and soybean buyers who must be registered with SPG (Gray and Bolek, 
2011). Unlike other Saskatchewan producer-controlled organizations, which are commissions, 
SPG is the only organization with non-refundable levies. SPG is governed by a Board of 
Directors (BOD) containing seven members that are elected every three years. These directors 
are elected to direct SPG in funding research projects that focus on issues and topics applicable 
to pulse growers throughout Saskatchewan. More specifically, SPG’s BODs work on the 
evaluation and approval of funding research projects and maintaining checkoff expenditures. 
y = -3.8529x + 251.4
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SPG’s funding model examines the overall value research applicants provide to producers and 
the pulse industry. SPG is involved in a wide range of activities including research projects, 
producer communications and workshops. These activities include the CDC’s development 
program, select seed growers program, and domestic and international market development 
programs such as funding Pulse Canada (Gray and Bolek, 2011).  
2.1.0 SPG’s Involvement in Pulse Breeding 
The CDC’s pulse breeding program is funded by SPG. Although the CDC is the owner of 
the varieties bred, SPG has exclusive rights to market and distribute CDC varieties under their 
select seed growers program. The program offers select-status growers in Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and Manitoba royalty free foundation seed (Saskatchewan Pulse Growers, 2017b).  This means 
that growers do not have to pay a levy to the seed distributor when they sell seed to producers. 
SPG funds this program through the checkoff levies they collect on production sales. For specific 
types of lentils and niche markets the SPG’s tender release program gives certain companies the 
exclusive right to sell seed to growers in which they receive a royalty on the seed (Saskatchewan 
Pulse Growers, 2017b).  
Recently, SPG has allowed SeCan and Seednet to distribute CDC pulse varieties outside 
of Saskatchewan. Gray and Bolek (2011) explain that SPG also provides private firms with an 
incentive to develop new markets in providing companies the exclusive right to sell CDC 
varieties to foreign countries, in return for a royalty.  SPG is also involved in research 
collaborations that are funded by the pulse science cluster. The pulse science cluster is affiliated 
with AAFC’s Growing Forward framework and funds large-scale research projects for pulses. 
Overall, SPG maintains a highly effective innovation system that can gain cooperation from 
government, private companies, and growers, which benefits the agricultural sector in western 
Canada. 
2.1.1 SPG’s Role in Soybeans  
Although SPG has contributed to pulse breeding, agronomic issues, and demand 
promotion, their current focus in soybeans has been limited to genomic research, agronomics and 
grower extension. With the increase in soybean production in Saskatchewan, SPG is informing 
producers on how to grow soybeans through workshops and seminars to stimulate adoption. 
Information is mostly on agronomic factors, which include seeding rates, fertilizer, inoculant, 
10 
 
treatment, chemical, and disease management. Because SPG supports the breeding and 
distribution of other pulses bred by the CDC, the development board plans to conduct a market 
study on soybeans in Saskatchewan before they decide to breed a variety of their own. Today, 
SPG’s role in soybean varietal development is:  
 “SPG is currently assessing the soybean variety development landscape to understand 
what role if any SPG should play in the soybean variety development space.  Unlike other 
pulses such as lentil and chickpea (where SPG provides significant support for pulse crop 
breeding), soybean variety development and release for Saskatchewan is undertaken 
significantly by small and large multinational corporations.  When this exercise is 
complete, SPG will decide on the best strategy for the pulse and soybean growers of the 
province.” (Mascarenhas, 2017) 
 SPG receives a 1% levy on the sale of soybeans (Saskatchewan Pulse Growers, 2016b). 
While much of this levy is directed to agronomic research, a sizable portion goes to genetic 
improvement. SPG has a total of $275,000 invested in research for genetic improvement in 
soybeans (Saskatchewan Pulse Growers, 2017a). The current amount of SPG funding 
contributed to the Soyagen project is $115,000 dollars. Notably, SPG does not hold the rights to 
the variety lines being developed within the Soyagen project.  
2.1.2 Mechanisms for Funding Breeding and the Role of IPRs 
At the CDC, check-off levies have been the largest contributor to the development of new 
pulse varieties in Saskatchewan. Apart from check-off levies, which are used for facilitating 
agricultural research and development across many commodity groups, other legal mechanisms 
are in place to fund plant breeding programs. 
 These mechanisms are known as Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and provide private 
firms with an economic incentive to invest in plant breeding. There are several types of IPRs that 
may be used to collect royalties on licensed seed. IPRs in the agricultural sector include Plant 
Breeders’ Rights (PBR), hybrids, Technology Use Agreements (TUA), and Closed Loop 
Marketing Agreements (CLMA) (Pidskalny, 2017).  
 A limitation of many IPRs is that producers can save and/or brown bag seed, which 
reduces royalty income, making it difficult for the private sector to successfully fund breeding 
programs. Brown bagging occurs when another producer illegally purchases licensed seed from 
other producers (Plant Breeders’ Rights, 2016). CLMAs and TUAs are considered attractive 
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IPRs in collecting royalties on the sale of seed. CLMAs restrict the buyer to sell their entire 
production quantity to a specific buyer (i.e. Warburtons). TUAs can legally force producers to 
sell all their production and require that seed is not reused for planting in the future (i.e. 
Monstanto). TUAs are only enforceable under utility patents, which in Canada can only be 
issued for GM crops. CLMAs do not require a patent, but are often difficult to enforce. SPG 
maintains funding for pulse breeding at the CDC through checkoff levies, instead of relying on 
royalties to fund the pulse breeding program. 
 In other countries, alternative royalty collection systems are in place to fund breeding 
programs. In Australia and France, End Point Royalty (EPR) systems have been implemented, 
which is a royalty collected on the sale of production. In Brazil, importers currently have a large-
scale TUA with Monsanto and DuPont for Intacta RR2 Pro Technology soybeans (St. Louis and 
Wilmington, 2016). The goal of these systems is to provide public institutions and private 
companies an incentive to fund breeding programs and foster innovation in the agricultural 
sector. 
2.1.3 Current soybean breeding and the seed industry 
2.1.3.0 United States 
 In the United States, soybean breeding programs are funded by similar value capture 
mechanisms as in Canada. Entities can file PBRs through UPOV 91 and utility patents through 
the Plant Variety Protection Act. The vast majority of breeding programs in the United States are 
funded by utility patents. Ninety percent of the utility patents on cultivars in the United States are 
issued for corn and soybeans (Fuglie et al, 2011). As of 1997, 70-90 percent of soybean acres 
consisted of private sector varieties (United States Department of Agriculture, 2004).  
The United Soybean Board (USB) and Qualified State Soybean Boards (QSSBs) are also 
a significant source, of largely upstream, breeding effort. These Boards are established via a 
federal marketing order that mandates a collection of 1% checkoff on the sales of soybeans, with 
proceeds being equally split between the two levels. The USB invests in genomics, breeding, 
agronomic research, and market development programs that are facilitated by QSSBs. USB 
checkoffs fund many breeding programs that already have outside support in laboratories, field 
sites and staff (United Soybean Board, 2017).  Currently, the USB is funding soybean breeding 
programs that enhance protein content without reducing yield and oil content. However, many of 
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these breeding programs are dedicated to pre-commercialization and focus on germplasm 
development. These property rights to these variety lines are either sold or given to private 
companies for commercialization. 
 In the 1950s, through state-level voluntary programs soybean producers joined together 
to increase profitability by investment schemes in research and demand promotion (Williams, 
Capps, and Lee, 2014). The national soybean checkoff program was implemented in the 1990 
Farm Bill where industry levies began to be collected nationally by the USB. The USB has 
invested 1.38 billion dollars in soybean research, promotion, and communications since 1970/71. 
Since the national program, and the creation of the USB, checkoff expenditure in soybean 
research from 1992/93 to 1998/99 has tripled in the United States. 
 Since the 1996 Farm Bill, evaluations of the effectiveness of commodity programs are 
mandatory every five years. The 2012/13 evaluation study finds that without a checkoff program, 
additional profits earned by soybean producers would not be as high as they are today (Williams, 
Capps, and Lee, 2014). A Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) shows that from 1980/81 to 2012/13 
additional profits to farmers with the check-off program are 6.5 dollars for every checkoff dollar 
spent between this time period (Williams, Capps, and Lee, 2014). The benefits from the check-
off program includes a bigger U.S. soybean industry, larger export markets, and reduced 
competitive threat from the South American soybean industry. The study states that failure to 
maintain soybean checkoff expenditures (for even one year) would reduce producer profits in 
future years. 
2.1.3.1 Eastern Canada 
 The current soybean breeding and seed industry in eastern Canada has a similar structure 
to the US where public and private markets can both fund soybean research. The large presence 
of food-grade soybeans in eastern Canada provides a premium to soybean growers that seed 
conventional varieties. These growers usually have a CLMA with their seed 
company/manufacturer when growing conventional varieties that are food grade. While the 
ability to crush biotech and conventional varieties provides growers with marketing flexibility, 
the coexistence of conventional and biotech varieties mitigates price risk when the demand for 
crush or food-edible soybeans is reduced. In some years, food-edible soybeans can acquire up to 
35% of the market share in Ontario and 50% in Quebec (Soy 20/20, 2013). 
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 In eastern Canada, most soybean breeding programs are publicly funded through AAFC 
with some being funded through checkoff levies, PBRs, CLMAs and/or TUAs. Again, the 
private market focuses more on capturing value through patents or CLMAs, while public 
programs may be funded by checkoff levies collected by Soy Canada. Soy Canada collects five 
cents per tonne levy from growers on the sale of production and two cents per tonne from 
soybean crushers (Minogue, 2015a). However, soybean crushers only pay a maximum of 20,000 
dollars when they exceed a million tonnes of crush per year.  Soybean exporters and seed 
companies also pay tiered fees up to 20,000 dollars a year to Soy Canada. Importantly, the two 
major public soybean breeders in eastern Canada are Agriculture and AgriFood Canada and the 
University of Guelph. 
2.1.3.2 Western Canada 
 The soybean seed industry in western Canada is primarily served by large multinational 
corporations (Mascarenhas, 2017). These corporations directly sell seed and some claim a 
royalty from TUAs, while producer-controlled organizations collect a checkoff levy on the sale 
of soybean production. Unlike the pulse sector, farmers are paying a relatively high price for 
soybean seed, which provides an incentive for private research and development for new short-
season varieties. In western Canada, there are currently three producer-controlled organizations 
that represent soybean growers and collect checkoff levies. These organizations include the 
Manitoba Pulse and Soybean Growers (MSPG), Alberta Pulse Growers (APG), and SPG. 
 In 1983, the MPSG formed as a group of bean growers in efforts to access support from 
the Agricultural Stabilization Act (Manitoba Pulse and Soybean Growers, 2016b). At the time, 
the government was unwilling to work with individual producers in providing support, but 
instead was willing to work with an organization. MPSG was incorporated in 1984 with eleven 
founding directors. During this time MPSG had no-funds (accounting and clerical duties were 
supported by Manitoba Agriculture) until they began to collect checkoff levies through the 
Agriculture Producers Funding Organization Act in 1989 (Manitoba Pulse and Soybean 
Growers, 2016b).  
MPSG is currently funded by a 0.5% checkoff levy that represents 3,500 pulse growers 
(Minogue, 2015b). In 2015, MPSG allocated 60% of their board budget of approximately 1.1 
million dollars to research projects (Manitoba Pulse and Soybean Growers, 2017). MPSG 
currently funds soybean research projects that explore genetic improvement, on-farm 
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management and agronomic issues. Genetic research is largely in collaboration with AAFC 
researchers in efforts to improve disease resistance and maturity of short-season varieties in 
western Canada.  
 The Alberta Pulse Growers (APG) represents pulse and soybean growers in Alberta 
funded by a 1% checkoff levy on production sales (Minogue, 2015b). Since a large portion of 
growers in Alberta seed peas, APG research investments for peas span genetic, yield, and health 
objectives. However, research contributions to soybean development in Alberta are much 
different in comparison to Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Alberta has decided to invest in research 
projects that identify genotypes to improve soybean yield in southern Alberta (Alberta Pulse 
Growers, 2017). Due to the lack of moisture in southern Alberta, research is specific to irrigation 
farms attempting to achieve a yield of 60 bushels per acre. Two studies by Manjula Bandara on 
soybean genetics are funded by APG looking at improving soybean competitiveness and cost-
effectiveness in southern Alberta (Alberta Pulse Growers, 2017). 
 SPG is the final producer-controlled organization in western Canada and represents pulse 
and soybean growers in Saskatchewan. They collect a one percent levy on all pulses and 
soybeans grown in Saskatchewan. In soybeans, investment has been limited for SPG, but will 
continue to grow with the expanded adoption of soybeans in Saskatchewan. 
2.2 Measures of economic surplus and market failures in crop breeding 
This section discusses the nature of market failures in the soybean industry in western 
Canada and how producer-controlled organization can correct these failures by investing in 
research. The section also discusses how spillover effects might be able to provide private firms 
with incentives to invest in research even when competing against subsidized research. The 
section concludes with a discussion on cooperatives and how their role in innovation differs from 
producer-controlled organizations. 
In a perfectly competitive market, under the restrictive assumptions where there are no 
efficiency losses, an efficient allocation of resources, and no additional gains from exchange, 
economic surplus is maximized (Frank, Parker, and Alger, 2013). In a market where these 
restrictions apply and there is monopolistic pricing, this creates a deadweight loss and reduces 
welfare. However, in a dynamic model, where firms can invest in research and development, 
patents, and the monopolistic power they provide, can improve welfare. 
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 In the soybean industry, a large majority of seed is patented and priced monopolistically 
in competition with other patented soybean varieties. In this setting, market power reduces the 
incentive to invest in breeding because a share of the quality improvement is captured by 
downstream industry (Malla and Gray, 2005). This effect is worsened when some varieties are 
developed without patents. Conventional varieties only acquire short-term property rights 
through PBRs, which reduces seed prices and increases the downstream spillovers, further 
reducing the incentive to invest (Shi, Chavas, and Steigert, 2010). Notably, SPG’s seed growers 
program distributes other pulse seed to farmers royalty free, which if implemented in soybeans 
would provide strong price competition for private breeders. 
2.2.0 The role of private, producer and public plant breeding in addressing market 
failures 
In the presence of market failures caused by monopolistic pricing of soybean seed, 
farmers end up paying a significant share of the rents and market inefficiencies get passed down 
the supply chain in the form of input and output prices. The role private, producer and public 
funded plant breeders play in addressing these market failures is to invest in research that makes 
seed available to farmers royalty free. Funding breeders also reduces the lack of investment that 
occurs when property rights are not strong. 
If private companies attempt to invest in conventional varieties, brown-bagging and farm 
saved seed would play against the collection of royalties on certified seed that are enforced by 
PBRs. In many cases, producers can readily save and/or brown bag conventional seed, making 
royalty collection for breeders difficult. In extreme cases, brown bagging and farm saved seed 
can result in unprofitable breeding programs. Depending on a breeder’s ability to commit to a 
future pricing scheme and whether farmers are myopic (unable to recognize future prices), Perrin 
and Fulginiti (2009) explain in a stylized model that breeders may have very little incentive to 
enter markets where only PBRs are permitted because farm saved seed limits them to 11-69% of 
marginal social welfare benefit. 
Because SPG already invests in pulse breeding at the CDC, they are a suitable example of 
a producer-controlled organization that addresses market failures caused by the lack of 
investment in breeding and research. SPG initially began to invest in pulse breeding due to the 
lack of private investment in the pulse industry. Notably, the private industry has made little 
effort to enter the pulse industry as they would be competing against subsidized research. 
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As a producer-controlled organization, SPG addresses market failures by investing in 
research that would otherwise not be invested in by the private market due to the low returns on 
investment. Private firms would not survive investing in the pulse sector as they are unable cover 
their cost of developing a technological advancement that gives them an increasing returns to 
scale production function (Fulton, 1997). This is because they are unable to patent pulse crops, as 
they would lose international markets if they did so, and do not possess enough market power 
with PBRs. Government has been involved in addressing these failures, but producers have been 
able to provide additional resources through funding research at the discretion of producer-
controlled organizations.  
In some cases, private breeders can invest in this type of research to address these market 
failures; however, their incentive to invest is much lower than for producer and public funded 
breeders. Therefore, producer and public breeders must be aware of these market failures when 
allocating funds to research projects. 
2.2.1 Crowding in and crowding out 
The implications of investing in research publicly has been politicized by many 
economists (Wolf, 1979). However, not considered by many of these economists is that 
government funded research may have spillover and crowding effects that would “crowd in” the 
private market and increase social welfare (Gray, Malla, and Tran, 2006). Notably, the private 
market may be disincentivized to invest in research because of government involvement. In this 
case, public investment is said to “crowd out” the private market. Malla and Gray (2005) find 
that basic research (i.e. scientific knowledge) in the canola sector “crowds in” the private market, 
while applied research (i.e. product development) “crowds out” the private market.  
Importantly, without technology spillovers from the public research, the private sector is 
likely to get crowded out when attempting to compete with subsidized research. However, 
investments in breeding made by the government, under certain circumstances, may spur private 
investment crowding in the private market. If there are large spillover effects, public investment 
is likely to improve economic surplus in providing the private market with new products at a 
zero marginal production cost. As stated by Fulton (1997), if the public market provides the 
private sector with knowledge that is non-rival and non-excludable, private firms in theory are 
more likely to price closer to marginal cost when using these inputs. Gray, Malla, and Tran 
(2006) explain that spillovers from public research steer private research and marketing towards 
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social interests, resulting in more productive private firms. With large research spillovers, private 
firms should benefit from products created by the public sector.  
The problem that arises in this case is the public market may not be able to provide the 
socially optimum amount of research, which causes a non-market failure (Fulton, 1997). In this 
case, the private market needs to acquire intellectual property rights to correct such non-market 
failures. Given this theory, it is still uncertain whether SPG investment in soybean breeding 
would “crowd out” the private market and needs thorough economic examination. 
To summarize, Figure 2.4 shows the three types of market and non-market failures in the 
plant breeding sector. Market and non-market failures in plant breeding can arise from the lack 
of intellectual property rights, monopoly pricing of seed, and crowding effects from public 
involvement. 
Figure 2.4: Three Types of Market and Non-Market Failures in the Plant Breeding Sector 
  
Source: Author 
2.2.2 Cooperative Role in Innovation 
In this section, we provide a brief literature review on cooperatives and how their role in 
innovation compares to a producer-controlled organization. Giannakas and Fulton (2005) explain 
that cooperatives are much different than regular businesses because customers/members of the 
cooperative can also be the owners of the business. In an agricultural setting, this means that 
farmers who purchase fertilizer and chemical from a cooperative agribusiness may also be the 
owners of that business. The purpose of having a customer owned business lets the members of 
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the cooperative directly influence business goals and operations. Because of this, cooperatives 
typically maximize member welfare by either returning profits to their members, or by investing 
retained earnings in infrastructure (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001).  Because producer-controlled 
organizations represent farmers, and invest levy dollars to maximize farmer welfare, their actions 
to some extent can be compared to a cooperative. Examining the effect cooperatives have on 
price and innovation from literature provides important insights on how a producer-controlled 
organization’s involvement in soybean breeding could impact price and innovation in western 
Canada.  
Giannakas and Fulton (2005) examine the impact a cooperative firm has on economic 
welfare when competing against an Investor Owned Firm (IOF) on price and innovation. The 
game assumes heterogeneity amongst consumers who purchase from either the cooperative firm 
or IOF. Results show that when there is low heterogeneity and similar innovation costs, both the 
cooperative and IOF have little incentive to innovate. When there is large heterogeneity and low 
innovation costs for the cooperative, there is greater total innovation activity. Giannakas and 
Fulton (2005) also show that by just having cooperative presence in the market benefits farmers 
even when innovation efforts fall. This is because prices are set lower when the IOF competes 
with a cooperative firm. For a producer-controlled organization seeking to invest in soybean 
breeding that would compete against private firms, literature suggests that heterogeneity and 
pricing has a large impact on total welfare and total innovation efforts. We examine these 
concepts for producer-controlled organizations in further detail throughout the rest of this thesis. 
The next chapter discusses the impact of entry in monopolistically competitive markets, 
game theory, and a private firm’s incentive to invest in soybean breeding when research 
spillovers exist.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Model of Strategic Investment and Entry 
3.0 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter one, despite the significant growth in soybean acres and the 
apparent potential for future soybean production in western Canada, the private sector has yet to 
establish a soybean breeding program north of the Upper Midwest U.S. border. At the same time, 
SPG, who collects a levy for research and has a successful pulse breeding program, have yet to 
fund a program for soybean breeding. In this chapter, we explore this lack of committed 
investment by either party using economic theory related to the hold-up problem as a plausible 
explanation for this outcome. We show that a hold-up problem can plausibly exist depending on 
the payoff matrix for SPG and the private sector. In Chapter 4, we build on this framework by 
exploring how product substitutability and SPG’s pricing behavior can change breeding payoffs. 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the theory of monopolistic competition, 
which is needed to examine strategic investment and entry in soybean breeding. This is followed 
with an extensive form game where SPG and a private firm choose whether to make the sunk 
cost of investing in a soybean breeding program. Within the extensive form game, we explain the 
scenarios that would lead to a hold-up problem and crowding out of the private firm. The section 
ends with a discussion on how a private firm’s incentive to invest in a soybean breeding program 
is influenced by SPG’s investment strategy. 
3.1 Monopolistic Competition 
In economics, partial equilibrium models usually assume that all products sold in the 
market are homogenous. However, in the case of monopolistic competition, firms can produce 
differentiated products at a sunk cost and sell their product at a monopolistic price (Binger and 
Hoffman, 1988). 
The model of monopolistic competition represents markets in which entry is limited due 
to factors such as patents, increasing returns to scale, and geographic isolation (Binger and 
Hoffman, 1988). Each of these factors are present in soybean breeding, making the model of 
monopolistic competition an appropriate comparison when modelling strategic investment and 
entry decisions.  
 Under monopolistic competition, as firms enter the market with new products, the 
demand for existing products decreases (Binger and Hoffman, 1988). When an incumbent firm 
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enters the market with a differentiated product, the demand for existing products generally 
decreases and may also become more elastic. Figure 3.0 shows this effect on the demand curve 
in which there is a rotation counter-clockwise and a shift to the left upon entry. When a new 
product enters the market, the market share and price of other products tends to decrease, 
reducing the profits of incumbent firms (as illustrated by the dotted area in Figure 3.0). While 
entry increases competition and lowers prices closer to marginal cost, monopolistic competition 
may still be far from being perfectly competitive. Because there are fixed costs involved in the 
production and sale of a new product, market prices have to exceed marginal costs by enough to 
cover these fixed costs. In a symmetric equilibrium, profits are positive, but will be negative if 
another firm enters the market. The market power is dependent on the degree of product 
differentiation and fixed costs per product. In the case of new plant varieties, the royalty stream 
has to be large enough to support the cost of variety breeding and development.  
Figure 3.0: The Effect of Entry on an Existing Firm under Monopolistic Competition 
 
Source: Adapted from Binger and Hoffman (1988) 
 Importantly, in monopolistically competitive markets, there is assumed to be economies 
of scale. The reason for a firm to have economies of scale is due to the large fixed costs that are 
acquired in producing a certain commodity. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) explain that firms will 
produce a commodity if the sum of their revenues, minus variable costs, covers their fixed cost. 
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In a competitive market, producing such a commodity would result in negative profits when 
marginal cost is equated to the demand price. Therefore, a monopolistic component, where prices 
exceed marginal cost, result in positive profits and production of a commodity. 
3.2 Extensive Form Game Theory 
Game theory is a branch of economics that has also been used to model firm entry. The 
standard assumptions in a symmetric game is that each player acts in self interest and anticipates 
other players to do the same. The most well-known game in game theory is the prisoner’s 
dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma is known as a simultaneous game, since both criminals decide 
whether to confess or remain silent in the same time period. In other games, decisions can either 
be made simultaneously or sequentially. When decisions are made sequentially, the game is 
often referred to as an extensive form game, meaning that players act in a sequence. The 
important feature in extensive form games is that players can observe their rival’s action. 
Extensive form games are often referred to as dynamic games because time is a factor or 
variable. These games must have a finite number of players, actions, nodes, and end set of 
actions and nodes (Jehle and Reny, 2011). Nodes are points at which a player must make their 
decision and can lead to another node or a specific outcome. 
When there are fixed costs that become sunk costs, the sequence of events matter. 
Whereas fixed costs can be avoided if an investment is not made, once incurred at least a portion 
of costs become sunk costs, which cannot be recovered. In the case of a new breeding program, 
many fixed costs would need to be incurred, some of them transactional in nature (hiring 
employees, developing and supply chain) and some physical in nature (preparing land, buildings, 
equipment). Once incurred, many of these costs become sunk and cannot be recovered. When 
sunk costs are present, subsequent entry of a rival can result in negative profits for an incumbent 
firm. It is therefore important for these firms to anticipate the future behavior of their potential 
competition and to operate accordingly. This behavior can be modeled in an extensive form 
game. 
If SPG’s decision to invest is modeled in an extensive form game, the decisions become 
more strategic. For example, SPG could make the decision to invest in a soybean breeding 
program, which would be followed by a private firm’s decision to invest in breeding. Similarly, a 
private firm could make the decision to invest prior to the decision of SPG to invest or not. As 
described below, a particular form of the game (i.e. particular payoffs and nodes) can lead to a 
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“hold-up problem” where neither firm invests in an otherwise viable breeding program before 
getting to that particular outcome, it is useful to describe the general nature of the problem and 
use game theory to consider the strategic behavior of players. 
First consider the case where SPG moves first and makes a decision to invest or not, and 
the private firm moves next to make their decision. Figure 3.1 shows a decision tree for this 
extensive form game, including the players, actions, nodes, and end set of nodes. Notably, SPG 
invests before the private firm where investment decisions may lead to four different outcomes 
(as illustrated in figure 3.1). These outcomes may be defined as dual entry (1), SPG entry (2), 
private entry (3) and no entry (4). 
Given the extensive form framework in figure 3.1, each player in the game has an 
objective to govern their investment strategy. Generally, the objective for a private firm is to 
maximize profits, whereas the objective for the producer elected SPG is to maximize farmer 
welfare. In figure 3.1, SPG’s investment decision is governed by maximizing farmer welfare, 
given the anticipated reaction of the private firm and their payoffs. For example, if SPG invests, 
it could deter private investment, which would result in outcome 2. If SPG does not invest, and it 
is profitable for the private firm to invest, the result will be outcome 3. SPG would then choose 
to invest or not depending on whether outcome 2 produced higher or lower outcome than 3. 
Figure 3.1: Extensive Form Game where SPG Moves First 
 
Source: Author 
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 Alternatively, SPG could postpone their decision to invest, and move after the private 
firm. This could result in a different outcome, because the two players have different incentives. 
If we look at figure 3.2, entry by the private firm could deter SPG investment, resulting in 
outcome 3. However, if SPG still finds it advantageous to enter, outcome 1 (dual entry) now 
becomes possible, but the private firm only invests if private profits of outcome 1 are greater 
than outcome 2. 
Figure 3.2: Extensive Form Game where the Private Firm Moves First 
 
Source: Author 
3.2.0 Hold-Up Problem 
The hold-up problem occurs when players delay performing an action, such as signing a 
contract or investing in a project, in anticipation of ex post opportunistic behavior (Fulton, 1997). 
This type of hold-up problem occurs when a player’s bargaining power, ex post, lowers the 
negotiated transfer price reducing their expected payoff. A player’s bargaining power depends on 
the degree of asset specificity and industry structure (Williamson, 1983). The hold-up problem 
results in the involved player not investing at all and foregoing a profitable opportunity. 
 SPG has publicly indicated to assess whether entering the soybean seed market. If they 
are strategically waiting until a private firm incurs a large sunk cost to establish a breeding 
program they may be creating a hold-up problem. If entry by the private firm could deter 
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investment unprofitable resulting in outcome 1, as shown in figure 3.3. The private firm 
anticipating this ex pot opportunistic behavior, will not invest, creating a hold-up problem where 
neither SPG or the private firm enters the market. 
Figure 3.3: Extensive Form Game where SPG Moves First and Ex Post 
 
Source: Author 
3.2.1 Crowding Out 
In the extensive form game, if SPG invests first, the hold-up problem is no longer 
present. However, the probability of crowding out the private firm is a concern and a major 
factor in SPG’s decision to enter the soybean market. Crowding out occurs when the private 
market’s payoff is greater to not invest, after SPG has made the decision to enter. This means 
that the payoff for the private firm in outcome 2 is greater than the payoff in outcome 1. 
To provide a clearer discussion on crowding out, a payoff matrix that includes outcomes 
for nodes (1) to (4) in figure 3.1 is provided in table 3.0. Table 3.0 shows the payoffs in normal 
form, instead of extensive form. The matrix shows payoffs for SPG and the private firm under 
SPG entry, private entry, dual entry, and no entry. The matrix below is not a simultaneous game; 
therefore, Nash equilibria are sub-game perfect and conditional on SPG’s decision to invest. The 
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outcome. Importantly, the private firm will not invest in soybean breeding if SPG entry results in 
negative profits, when SPG has invested or when SPG has an ex post incentive to invest. This 
result, which seems to be consistent with current investment patterns, is of course dependent on 
the payoff matrix. 
In reality, SPG has a number of policy instruments that they could use to increase private 
incentives to invest, if producers desire this outcome. SPG could, in theory, change this no 
investment outcome by taking measures to increase private profits in the case of dual entry. 
Potential measures include producing varieties that are more differentiated and less substitutable 
with the private varieties, by providing research spillovers to the private firm by sharing 
knowledge and germplasm, or by increasing their variety prices to reduce the degree of 
competition with the private sector. 
Table 3.0. SPG and the Private Firm Payoff Matrix      
Investment Payoff 
Matrix      
SPG1 
Do Not Invest Invest 
Private Firm 
Do 
Not 
Invest 
(0, 0) (1, 0) 
Invest (1, 2) (2, -1) 
Source: Author 
1SPG payoffs are n, and Private Firm payoffs are m, in the (n,m) payoff for each outcome. 
3.2.2 Extensive Form Game Conclusion 
To summarize this discussion, we have identified that a private firm will consider the 
actions and impacts of potential SPG entry in soybean breeding just as SPG will consider the 
actions and reactions of the private firm to their breeding investments. When there are sunk costs 
involved, the order of investment modeled in an extensive form game can change investment 
outcomes. A hold-up problem can exist if SPG is waiting for private investment, has an incentive 
for ex post entry, and this entry would make private investment unprofitable. Ultimately, the 
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behavior of both players will be a function of the payoff matrix as each attempt to maximize 
their objective, given the actions and reactions of their rivals. 
The extensive form game explored in this chapter is dynamic and considers SPG and 
private firm investment decisions as binary. Even in this binary form, a number of outcomes are 
possible depending on the nature of the payoff matrix. In Chapter 4, we further explore the 
strategic interaction between SPG and the private firm assuming that both firms operate and 
choose the level of investment and pricing of their products. Both simultaneous and sequential 
games are employed to examine how the degree of substitutability, investment, and level of 
existing seed technology can impact SPG and private firm incentives for investing in soybean 
breeding. 
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Chapter 4 Two Stage Game 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter now uses a two-stage game theoretical model to examine how the degree of 
substitutability, investment, and the level of existing seed technology impact SPG and private 
firm entry decisions. In contrast to chapter 3 where SPG and the private firm made the decision 
to invest in a soybean breeding program based on their payoffs from investing, the two-stage 
game assumes both firms have a program and are just considering research investment, pricing 
and quantity. We assume that there is a fixed cost of breeding, but no sunk costs as in chapter 3. 
More specifically, the game examines how the level of investment, degree of substitutability, and 
level of existing seed technology impact each player’s investment and pricing decisions. 
Investment is not a binary decision in the two-stage game and each player can choose how much 
they invest in breeding. The two-stage game is important to the thesis as it quantifies conditions 
where SPG’s investment in soybean breeding crowds out the private firm. This is modelled as a 
simultaneous investment game as well as a sequential investment game. The two-stage game 
shows that the degree of substitutability and existing level of seed technology have the large 
impact on private investment and crowding effects. These results provide important policy 
implications for SPG and how they decide to invest in a soybean breeding program at the CDC. 
More specifically, the goal of the two-stage game is to examine how SPG investment 
crowds out private investment and profits. The game also examines how farmer welfare and 
social welfare change with SPG’s breeding investment. In the first stage of the game, SPG and 
the private firm set their level of investment in soybean breeding. After investments have been 
made, SPG and the private firm select their quantity of seed to produce in the second stage. In 
the two-stage game, SPG’s objective is to maximize farmer welfare, whereas the private firm’s 
objective is to maximize their profits. 
Because SPG has the choice to invest in a soybean breeding program at the CDC prior to 
the private firm’s investment. The two-stage game is separated into two modelling environments 
that include simultaneous and sequential investments. 
In the first modelling environment, SPG and the private firm invest simultaneously. The 
Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is obtained in this model where SPG and the private 
firm invest optimally to receive the highest payoff possible. The first modelling environment is 
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labelled as the “Simultaneous Research game” because SPG and the private firm both invest in 
research simultaneously. 
The second modelling environment examines whether SPG investment crowds out the 
private firm when investments are made sequentially. For sequential investment, SPG invests 
first because they are signaling the private market and showing leadership in the market. This 
model is a Stackelberg game meaning that the private firm invests after SPG, setting their level 
of investment conditional on SPG’s level of investment. SPG fully anticipates the private firm’s 
reaction and invests accordingly. This model also results in a SPNE for investment strategies. 
The second modelling environment is labelled as the “SPG Led Stackelberg game”. It differs 
from the Simultaneous Research game only in the first stage derivation because SPG and the 
private firm still set quantity simultaneously in the second stage. 
The chapter outline is as follows. Section 4.1 describes the specification and initial 
assumption/restrictions in the two-stage game theoretical model. Section 4.2 describes the 
second stage of game and begins to solve the theoretical model using backward induction. The 
second stage of the two-stage game applies to both the Simultaneous Research game and the 
SPG Led Stackelberg game. Section 4.3 solves the first stage of, and conducts comparative 
statics for the Simultaneous Research game. The first stage of the SPG Led Stackelberg game is 
solved in section 4.4, and comparative statics are also developed. The chapter ends with a policy 
implications and conclusions section that discusses the welfare outcomes for specific investment 
strategies.  
4.1 Model Specification 
This section describes the initial specifications and assumptions that lead into solving the 
two-stage game. This entails deriving the inverse demand curves for SPG and private firm 
soybean seed. The inverse demand curves for soybean seed are derived from a quadratic 
production function as in Hervouet and Trommetter (2017). The inverse demand curves take a 
unique functional form in which the degree of sustainability is parameterized, which 
proportionally impacts the demand for seed in competing markets. Simply, this section discusses 
the specification of the production function, the derivation of demand curves from the farmers’ 
maximization problem, the cost of seed technology, and the model mechanics. 
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4.1.0 Production Function 
To derive linear inverse demand curves for SPG and private soybean seed, we use a 
quadratic production function adapted from Hervouet and Trommetter (2017). Hervouet and 
Trommetter use a quadratic utility function, instead of a production function, which is given by 
Singh and Vives (1984) and Dixit (1979), to determine the impact of sharing knowledge between 
two firms in the plant breeding sector. They construct a similar two-stage theoretical model 
where competing firms share knowledge in the first stage and compete on quantity in the second 
stage. They use this functional form to parameterize the degree of substitutability and spillover 
effects. The quadratic utility function also makes welfare analysis tractable because the inverse-
demand curves and cost functions are linear. Hervouet and Trommetter (2017) include two 
parameters that model the positive and negative externalities from spillover effects. Because 
these externalities create rather complex investment thresholds, the two-stage game theoretical 
model in this chapter does not include spillover effects and only the degree of substitutability. 
The theoretical model developed in this thesis converts the quadratic utility function used 
in Hervouet and Trommetter (2017) to a production function for soybeans. This assumes that 
production inputs are seed where the type of seed used determines a farmer’s production output. 
This is an appropriate assumption because output does depend on the type of seed farmers use. 
This functional form is preferred to the constant elasticity of substitution production function 
because the inverse seed demand curves derived are linear. The functional form also 
parameterizes the degree of substitutability between varieties. This makes the investment 
strategies unique because SPG can invest by seed trait, which changes the degree of 
substitutability. 
Equation 4.1 shows the quadratic production function. Importantly, soybean output for 
farmers is given by the quantity of seed they purchase from SPG and the private firm and the 
export level of seed technology for each variety. The export level of seed technology for SPG 
and private varieties are represented by 𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺   and 𝛼𝑃𝑉. This means that better seed technology 
for a certain variety leads to higher yield and output.  
To represent the degree of substitutability between SPG and private soybean seed, a 
dependence coefficient, 𝛾, is included in the production function. Importantly, 𝛾 > 0 means that 
varieties are substitutable, and 𝛾 = 0 means varieties are not substitutable. Hervouet and 
Trommetter (2017) state if 𝛾 = 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑃𝑉 then varieties are perfect substitutes and if 𝛾 < 0 
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varieties are complementary. In equation 4.1, there is a constraint on 𝛾 so that 𝛾 ∈ [0,1] and 
elasticity parameters 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝐺 and 𝛽𝑃𝑉 are normalized to unity. This means that when 𝛾 = 1, 
soybean varieties are perfect substitutes. If soybean varieties serve different end-use markets or 
vary largely in traits, then 𝛾 = 0. This means the benefit of seeding another variety when they 
have non-substitutable traits is zero. A farmer that seeds only biotech soybeans does not benefit 
from seeding food edible soybeans, and vice-versa. This is a restrictive assumption that is 
imposed in the production function to model the level of competition in the two-stage game. 
(4.1) 𝑌(𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 , 𝑞𝑃𝑉) = 𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 + 𝛼𝑃𝑉𝑞𝑃𝑉 −
1
2
(𝛽𝑆𝑃𝐺𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺
2 + 2𝛾𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺𝑞𝑃𝑉 + 𝛽𝑃𝑉𝑞𝑃𝑉
2 ) 
 Where: 𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 = the quantity of SPG soybean seed 
   𝑞𝑃𝑉 = the quantity of private firm soybean seed 
   𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺  = SPG’s export level of seed technology 
  𝛼𝑃𝑉  = the private firm’s export level of seed technology 
  𝛽𝑆𝑃𝐺  = elasticity parameter for SPG soybean seed 
𝛽𝑃𝑉 = elasticity parameter for private firm soybean seed 
   𝛾 = dependence coefficient 
In equation 4.2, farmers maximize their profits subject to the quantity of SPG and private 
firm soybean seed. Importantly, the output price, 𝑝𝑜, is normalized to one. Substituting the 
production function into this problem results in equation 4.3. From this maximization problem, 
the inverse demand curves for SPG and private firm soybean seed are derived. In equation 4.4, 
quantity has the biggest impact competitor’s price when varieties are perfect substitutes. SPG 
and private demands may also be derived as own and competitor price (Singh and Vives, 1984; 
Hervouet and Trommetter, 2017). 
In equation 4.4, a higher export level of seed technology (𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺 , 𝛼𝑃𝑉) increases farmers’ 
willingness to pay for seed (Hervouet and Trommetter, 2017). In the two-stage game, SPG and 
the private firm can set their export level of seed technology by investing in soybean breeding. 
This means that 𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺   and 𝛼𝑃𝑉 in the two-stage game are taken as the level of investment in 
soybean breeding for each player. However, 𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺  and 𝛼𝑃𝑉 represent the investment cost of 
achieving a specific export level of seed technology. It is assumed that SPG and the private firm 
have zero marginal seed production costs. This means that the unit cost on seed is normalized to 
zero. SPG and the private firm are assumed to have the same unit cost for seed because they 
must comply with regulations on plant variety creation (Hervouet and Trommetter, 2017). SPG 
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and the private firm both endure a fixed cost for the export level of seed technology when they 
invest in soybean breeding.  
(4.2) max
𝑞𝑃𝑉,𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑜𝑌(𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 , 𝑞𝑃𝑉) − 𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝑝𝑃𝑉𝑞𝑃𝑉      
(4.3) max
𝑞𝑃𝑉,𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺
𝜋 = 𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 + 𝛼𝑃𝑉𝑞𝑃𝑉 −
1
2
(𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺
2 + 2𝛾𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺𝑞𝑃𝑉 + 𝑞𝑃𝑉
2 ) − 𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 −
𝑝𝑃𝑉𝑞𝑃𝑉      
(4.4) 𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺 = 𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝛾𝑞𝑃𝑉        and           𝑝𝑃𝑉 = 𝛼𝑃𝑉 − 𝑞𝑃𝑉 − 𝛾𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺       
4.1.1 Cost of Seed Technology 
The fixed cost of investment for SPG and the private firm is defined in equation 4.5. The 
cost of export seed technology for SPG and the private firm depends on the level of existing seed 
technology (𝛼𝑖
𝑜). If the level of existing seed technology is high, then SPG and the private firm 
must invest more to raise the export level of seed technology. Therefore, the difference between 
𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑖
𝑜 represents the change in export seed technology as a result of investment in soybean 
breeding. 
 Hervouet and Trommetter (2017) constrain 𝛼𝑖 > 0, implying that each firm must invest a 
positive amount in their theoretical model. In the two-stage game, the non-negative constraint, 
𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛼𝑖
𝑜, prevents each player from investing in an export seed technology that is lower than the 
existing level of seed technology. This is an appropriate assumption because breeders must 
develop seed technology that is greater or equal to existing seed technology for variety 
registration in Canada. In equation 4.5, the cost function is scaled by 𝜃 to satisfy concavity in the 
objective functions. If 𝜃 is greater than 2.5, concavity holds in the two-stage game. However, 𝜃 
is instead set to four, which is well above the threshold. This means that SPG and the private 
firm cannot invest an infinite amount in soybean breeding because technology costs are assumed 
to be expensive. 
 (4.5)  𝐶 = 𝜃(𝛼𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖
𝑜)2         𝑠. 𝑡.      𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛼𝑖
𝑜            𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒    𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑃𝐺, 𝑃𝑉} 
Where: 𝛼𝑖 = the export level of seed technology 
𝛼𝑖
𝑜 = represents the level of existing seed technology 
𝜃    = scalar parameter 
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4.1.2 Model Mechanics 
This section provides a simple graphical example to explain how the degree of 
substitutability and SPG investment impact the private firm in the two-stage game. Figure 4.0 
shows the impact on the private firm from SPG investing in soybean breeding. Depending on the 
degree of substitutability, SPG investment shifts the demand for private seed downwards, 
reducing private investment, price, and profits. In the SPG seed market, investment shifts the 
demand for seed upwards, increasing farmer welfare in the SPG market.  
In figure 4.0, the downward shift in demand for seed in the private firm market depends 
on the degree of substitutability between SPG and private soybeans. If SPG invests in biotech 
traits, resulting in varieties being close substitutes (𝛾 = 1), the private firm could potentially be 
crowded out of the soybean market. If SPG invests in food edible traits, where varieties are not 
substitutes (𝛾 = 0), there is less of an impact on the private firm. This assumption assumes that 
farmers who have access to closed loop marketing agreements for food edible soybeans have 
little benefit in seeding biotech soybeans. Whereas farmers that only have biotech market access 
from grain handlers have little benefit in seeding food edible soybeans. 
Figure 4.0: Two-stage game – Impact of SPG investment on farmer welfare and private 
profits
 
Source: Author 
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4.2 Solving the Second Stage of the Two-Stage Game  
This section presents the objective functions for SPG and the private firm and begins 
solving the two-stage game. The two-stage game is solved by backward induction starting in the 
second stage of the game. Importantly, the second stage of the game applies to both the 
Simultaneous Research game and the SPG Led Stackelberg game. 
The objective functions for SPG and the private firm are shown in equations 4.6 and 4.7. 
The inverse demand curves derived from the quadratic production function are substituted into 
each objective function. In equation 4.6, the private firm maximizes profits with respect to the 
quantity of seed produced. In equation 4.7, SPG maximizes farmer welfare with respect to 
quantity of seed produced. SPG maximizes aggregate farmer welfare, or profit, which includes 
the welfare in both the SPG market and private firm market. SPG profit is not subtracted in the 
SPG market because profits are re-directed to farmers through investment in research.  
In the cost function for seed technology (equation 4.5), SPG and the private firm had 
separate levels of existing seed technology. In equation 4.7, SPG’s level existing of seed 
technology equals the private firm’s level of existing seed technology (𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ) multiplied by the 
proportional difference in the level of existing seed technology (𝜅). The proportional difference 
in the level of existing seed technology (𝜅) represents whether SPG’s level of existing seed 
technology relative to the private firm’s technology. When 𝜅 = 0, SPG enters the market with 
uncompetitive existing seed technology, whereas the private firm always has a positive level of 
existing seed technology (𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 > 0). The private firm has existing seed technology because they 
already have biotech seed in western Canada. When 𝜅 = 1, SPG has equal soybean seed 
technology and is fully competitive with existing private seed technology. In the two-stage game, 
SPG and the private firm must invest more than their level of existing seed technology where 
𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝜅𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ≥ 0 and 𝛼𝑃𝑉 − 𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ≥ 0. If SPG has uncompetitive existing seed technology, then 
investment must be greater than zero. 
(4.6) max
𝑞𝑃𝑉
𝜋𝑃𝑉 = (𝛼𝑃𝑉 − 𝑞𝑃𝑉 − 𝛾𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺)𝑞𝑃𝑉 − 4(𝛼𝑃𝑉 − 𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 )2  
(4.7) max
𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺
𝐹𝑊 = ∫(𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝛾𝑞𝑃𝑉)𝑑𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 + ∫(𝛼𝑃𝑉 − 𝑞𝑃𝑉 − 𝛾𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺)𝑑𝑞𝑃𝑉 − 𝑝𝑃𝑉𝑞𝑃𝑉 −
 4(𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝜅𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 )2                   
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Where: κ = the level of SPG existing seed technology relative to the level of private 
firm’s existing seed technology  
Equation 4.8 shows the reaction functions for SPG and the private firm, which are 
derived from their objective functions. The reaction functions estimate the optimal quantity that 
maximizes private profits or farmer welfare with respect to their competitor’s quantity. When the 
degree of substitutability is zero, SPG supplies the whole market, whereas the private firm 
supplies half the market. Because there are no unit costs, the private firm sets quantity 
monopolistically and SPG sets quantity competitively. However, SPG and the private firm 
reduce quantity when seed varieties become more substitutable. This reduces the size of the 
soybean market when holding investment constant. 
(4.8)  𝑞𝑃𝑉 =
𝛼𝑃𝑉−𝛾𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺
2
      and  𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 = α𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝛾𝑞𝑃𝑉  
To obtain the SPNE, SPG and the private firm must pick their optimal quantity based on 
their competitor’s optimal quantity. This is done by substituting the reaction functions into each 
other and finding the intersection of the reaction curves. At the SPNE, SPG and the private firm 
are unable to gain from changing their quantity. Equation 4.10 shows the equilibrium quantities 
for SPG and the private firm. The equilibrium quantities depend only on investment and the 
degree of substitutability. 
In equation 4.9, as the degree of substitutability increases, optimal private quantity 
decreases. If SPG invests more in biotech traits (𝛾 = 1) than the private firm, private quantity is 
equal to zero. However, if the private firm invests twice as much as SPG in biotech traits, SPG 
quantity is equal to zero. When SPG invests in food edible traits and the private firm invests in 
biotech traits (𝛾 = 0), both set their highest quantity. 
(4.9) 𝑞𝑃𝑉
∗ =
𝛼𝑃𝑉−𝛾𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺
2−𝛾2
         and        𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺
∗ =
2𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺−𝛾𝛼𝑃𝑉
2−𝛾2
 
Equation 4.10 shows the equilibrium prices for SPG and the private firm. These are 
solved by substituting the equilibrium quantities into the inverse seed demand curves. The 
private firm’s optimal price is equal to their optimal quantity. However, SPG sets price equal to 
zero, which evidently maximizes farmer welfare. 
(4.10) 𝑝𝑃𝑉
∗ =
𝛼𝑃𝑉−𝛾𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺
2−𝛾2
  and 𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺
∗ = 0 
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4.3 Solving the First Stage of the Simultaneous Research Game 
This section solves the first stage of the simultaneous research game where SPG and the 
private firm invest in soybean breeding at the same time. To solve the first stage of the 
simultaneous research game, the optimal quantities and prices must be substituted into the 
objective functions. This means that SPG and the private firm now maximize their objective 
function with respect to investment at their optimal quantity and price. 
In equation 4.11, the private firm maximizes profits with respect to their level of 
investment. Whereas SPG maximizes farmer welfare with respect to their level of investment in 
equation 4.12. Note that in the second stage, SPG and the private firm set quantity at a zero unit 
cost. In the first stage, there is a fixed cost of investment that constrains how much SPG and the 
private firm can invest in soybean breeding. 
(4.11) max
𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝜋𝑃𝑉 =
(𝛼𝑃𝑉−𝛾𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺)
2
(2−𝛾2)2
− 4(𝛼𝑃𝑉 − 𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 )2  
(4.12) max
𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺
𝐹𝑊 = ∫ (𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝛾𝑞𝑃𝑉)𝑑𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺
𝑞𝑖
∗
0
+ ∫ (𝛼𝑃𝑉 − 𝑞𝑃𝑉 − 𝛾𝑞𝑆𝑃𝐺)𝑑𝑞𝑃𝑉 − 𝑝𝑃𝑉
∗ 𝑞𝑃𝑉
∗𝑞𝑖
∗
0
−
4(𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝜅𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 )2  
The first order conditions from the objective functions are shown in equations 4.13 and 
4.14. Equation 4.14 takes a complex form due to the integration over inverse seed demand 
curves. Provided that farmer welfare function was defined as half base times height at the 
optimal quantity and price, SPG’s first order condition would take a less complex form. 
(4.13) 
2(𝛼𝑃𝑉−𝛾𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺)
(2−𝛾2)2
− 8(𝛼𝑃𝑉 − 𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ) = 0 
(4.14) 
4𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺−𝛾𝛼𝑃𝑉
2−𝛾2
−
4(2𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺−𝛾𝛼𝑃𝑉)
2(2−𝛾2)2
− [
−𝛾2
2−𝛾2
∙
2𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺−𝛾𝛼𝑃𝑉
2−𝛾2
+
2𝛾
2−𝛾2
∙
𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺−𝛾𝛼𝑃𝑉
2−𝛾2
] +
𝛾𝛼𝑃𝑉
2−𝛾2
+
2𝛾(𝛼𝑃𝑉−𝛾𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺)
(2−𝛾2)2
− [
2𝛾
2−𝛾2
∙
𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺−𝛾𝛼𝑃𝑉
2−𝛾2
+
−𝛾2
2−𝛾2
∙
2𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺−𝛾𝛼𝑃𝑉
2−𝛾2
] +
2𝛾(𝛼𝑃𝑉−𝛾𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺)
(2−𝛾2)2
− 8(𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺 − 𝜅𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ) = 0 
The second order conditions from the objective functions in the first stage are negative, 
as shown in equation 4.15. This means that the private firm and SPG are reaching a maximum 
profit or farmer welfare when setting their level of investment and level of seed quality. 
 (4.15) 
2
(2−γ2)2
− 8 < 0            and             
4
2−γ2
+
5γ2−4
(2−γ2)2
− 8 < 0 
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The reaction functions are now in terms of investment for SPG and the private firm, as 
shown in equation 4.16. In SPG’s reaction function, there is a threshold level of substitutability 
that changes the sign on private investment. If the private firm increases their level of 
investment, SPG’s level of investment increases when they select food edible traits (𝛾 < 0.707). 
However, private investment has a negative impact on SPG’s investment when they select 
biotech traits (𝛾 > 0.707). This is interesting because SPG invests more in food edible traits 
when the private firm increases their level of investment. In the private firm’s reaction function, 
SPG investment always has a negative impact on their level of investment. In SPG’s reaction 
function, SPG investment is highest when they have a relatively high level of existing seed 
technology (𝜅 is high).  
 (4.16)  𝛼𝑃𝑉 =
4𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ൫2−𝛾2൯
2
−𝛾𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺
4𝛾4−16𝛾2+15
   and               𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺 =
8𝜅𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ൫2−𝛾2൯
2
+𝛼𝑃𝑉൫𝛾−2𝛾
3൯
8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28
  
The equilibrium investment functions for SPG and the private firm are shown in 
equations 4.17 and 4.18. SPG and the private firm receive the highest payoff possible when they 
invest where their investment reaction curves intersect. This is referred to as the SPNE because 
neither player can gain from changing their investment strategy. At the SPNE, optimal 
investment depends on the proportional difference in the level of existing seed technology (𝜅), 
the degree of substitutability (𝛾), and the level of existing seed technology (𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ).  
In equation 4.17, the difference in the level of existing seed technology has a negative 
impact on the private firm’s optimal level of investment. This means that the private firm’s 
optimal investment is reduced when SPG has momentum in soybean breeding. In equation 4.18, 
the difference in the level of existing seed technology has a positive impact on SPG’s optimal 
level of investment. This means that it is optimal for SPG to invest more in soybean breeding 
when they have a high level of existing seed technology because there is more area underneath 
the demand curve.  
(4.17) 𝛼𝑃𝑉
∗ =
𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 (4൫2−𝛾2൯
2
൫8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28൯−8𝜅𝛾(2−𝛾2)2)
(8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28)(4𝛾4−16𝛾2+15)
 
 (4.18) 𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺
∗ =
𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 (8𝜅൫2−𝛾2൯
2
൫4𝛾4−16𝛾2+15൯+4(2−𝛾2)(𝛾−2𝛾3))
(8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28)(4𝛾4−16𝛾2+15)+𝛾2−2𝛾4
  
37 
 
Because equations 4.17 and 4.18 are complex in the degree of substitutability, the 
comparative statics section further examines how substitutability impacts optimal investment. 
The comparative statics also examines how private profits and farmer welfare change with the 
degree of substitutability and the difference in the level of existing seed technology. 
4.3.0 Simultaneous Research Game Comparative Statics 
In the Simultaneous Research game, the only parameters that are exogenous and have an 
impact on optimal investment at the SPNE are the degree of substitutability (𝛾), level of existing 
seed technology (𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ) and the proportional difference in the level of existing seed technology 
(𝜅). Other endogenous parameters, such as quantity (𝑞𝑖), price (𝑝𝑖), investment (𝛼𝑖), farmer 
welfare (𝐹𝑊), and private profits (𝜋𝑃𝑉), cannot be used in comparative statics for the 
Simultaneous Research game. 
 This section uses these exogenous parameters to examine how substitutability and 
existing seed technology impact optimal price, quantity, investment, private profits, and farmer 
welfare. Although SPG’s objective is to maximize farmer welfare, they may be hesitant to invest 
in traits that could potentially crowd out the private firm. SPG’s authority to operate is delegated 
from the provincial government who may have broader interest in private sector soybean 
development. For this reason, SPG must consider the crowding effects, even though their 
objective is to maximize farmer welfare. In this section, SPG can use the degree of 
substitutability as a policy parameter to select traits that reduce crowding effects. Crowding 
effects also depend on how much SPG or Ag Canada has already invested in soybean genetics 
and their relative level of existing seed technology (level of 𝜅). Because the private firm only 
invests in biotech traits, SPG would lower the degree of substitutability by selecting food edible 
traits. Momentum in soybean breeding for SPG depends on their previous investments in biotech 
or food edible soybean genetics. 
The first comparative static analysis in this section examines how the degree of 
substitutability impacts optimal investment for SPG and the private firm. Equation 4.19 and 4.20 
show the partial derivative of optimal investment and the degree of substitutability. Whether 
substitutability has a negative or positive impact on optimal investment depends on the degree of 
substitutability and difference in the level of existing seed technology. 
 Equation 4.19 shows that when SPG invests in biotech traits, substitutability has a 
positive impact on private investment when SPG has a low level of existing seed technology 
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(𝜅 < 0.146). However, SPG has a negative impact on private investment when they invest in 
biotech traits and have greater level of existing seed technology (𝜅 > 0.146).  
(4.19) 
𝜕𝛼𝑃𝑉
∗
𝜕𝛾
=
8𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ൫𝛾2−2൯(𝜅൫96𝛾10−708𝛾8+1840𝛾6−1731𝛾4−214𝛾2+840൯−2𝛾൫8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28൯
2
)
(8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28)2(4𝛾4−16𝛾2+15)2
⋚ 0 
Equation 4.20 shows the effect substitutability has on SPG optimal investment. Optimal 
investment for SPG is negatively impacted when they invest in biotech traits and have a lower 
level of existing seed technology (𝜅 < 0.357). Whereas investment is positively impacted when 
they invest in biotech traits with a higher level of existing seed technology (𝜅 > 0.357). This 
means that it is optimal for SPG to invest more in soybean breeding when they select biotech 
traits and have competitive seed technology.  
(4.20) 
𝜕𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺
∗
𝜕𝛾
= −
2𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 (4𝜅𝛾൫8𝛾8+40𝛾6−396𝛾4+840𝛾2−555൯+3൫32𝛾8−92𝛾6−24𝛾4+149𝛾2−35൯)
(−16𝛾6+98𝛾4−183𝛾2+105)2
⋛ 0 
To provide a better understanding of these relationships, three-dimensional graphs show 
how optimal investment for SPG and the private firm change with the level of 𝜅 and 𝛾 (figure 4.1 
and 4.2). Figure 4.1 shows that the degree of substitutability positively impacts SPG’s optimal 
investment when they have a relatively competitive level of existing seed technology. However, 
when SPG has no relative level of existing seed technology, they reduce their optimal 
investment. When varieties are not substitutable (𝛾 = 0), regardless of the level of 𝜅, optimal 
investment is unchanged. These comparative static results show that as the degree of 
substitutability increases, the impact of the difference in existing seed technology becomes more 
pronounced in both directions. When SPG has no existing technology, they lower their level of 
investment in soybean breeding. When SPG has competitive existing seed technology, they 
invest much more in breeding. 
Figure 4.2 shows the opposite effect for optimal private investment. Also, the axes for 𝛾 
and 𝜅  have been reversed in figure 4.2. When SPG invests in biotech traits and has competitive 
technology (𝜅 is high), optimal private investment is reduced. And when SPG invests with 
uncompetitive existing seed technology (𝜅 is low), optimal private investment increases. This is 
an important relationship in the model because SPG may not want to crowd out the private firm. 
Private investment is lower when SPG invests in biotech traits that are competitive with private 
varieties. However, the private firm invests more when SPG invests in biotech traits that are 
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inferior to private varieties. These comparative statics shows that when substitutability is high, 
the marginal effects of an increase in substitutability on private investment, both positive and 
negative, become more pronounced. When there is high substitutability, the marginal impact 
switches from positive to negative for different relative SPG seed technology. 
Figure 4.1: The impact of substitutability (𝜸) on optimal SPG investment by the degree of 
substitutability (𝝏𝜶𝑷𝑽
∗ /𝝏𝜸) and the difference in the level of existing seed technology (𝜿)
 
Source: Author 
Figure 4.2: The impact of substitutability (𝜸) on optimal private investment by the degree 
of substitutability (𝝏𝜶𝑷𝑽
∗ /𝝏𝜸) and the proportional difference in the level of existing seed 
technology (𝜿) 
  
Source: Author 
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Figure 4.3 shows the effect of the proportional difference in the level of existing seed 
technology directly on private price, quantity, investment, and SPG quantity and investment. 
Panels (a) and (c) shows that private optimal quantity, price, and investment are reduced when 
SPG has a competitive level of existing seed technology. Panels (b) and (d) show that SPG 
optimal quantity and investment increase when they have competitive seed technology. When 
SPG has uncompetitive existing seed technology, SPG optimal quantity and investment reduce 
and private price, quantity, and investment increase. 
Figure 4.3: Simultaneous Research game private and SPG optimal price, quantity, and 
investment with respect to the proportional difference in the level of existing seed 
technology (𝜿) and the degree of substitutability (𝜸) (𝜶𝑷𝑽
𝒐 = 𝟏𝟎) 
 
Source: Author 
So far, the comparative statics indicate that when SPG has competitive existing seed 
technology and selects biotech traits, they reduce private price, quantity, and investment. Figure 
4.4 shows that when SPG invests in biotech traits and has competitive technology, they also 
reduce private profits to zero. Panel (a) shows that SPG crowds out the private firm when they 
have a competitive level of existing seed technology and invest in biotech traits.  Importantly, 
farmer welfare is maximized when SPG has competitive seed technology (panel (b), figure 4.4). 
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If SPG has uncompetitive existing seed technology, farmer welfare is reduced regardless of the 
degree of substitutability. 
If SPG does not want to crowd out the private firm, they can either reduce substitutability 
by selecting food edible seed traits that do not compete with private varieties. However, SPG 
reduces private profits when they have competitive existing seed technology for all degrees of 
substitutability. The private firm is crowded out in the case where SPG invests in biotech traits 
and has competitive seed technology. 
Figure 4.4: Simultaneous Research game private profits and farmer welfare with respect to 
the proportional difference in the level of existing seed technology (𝜿) and the degree of 
substitutability (𝜸) (𝜶𝑷𝑽
𝒐 = 𝟏𝟎) 
 
 
Source: Author 
4.3.1  Simultaneous Research Game Conclusion 
The results of the Simultaneous Research game suggest that the private firm is less likely 
to be crowded out at lower levels of substitutability. These results are consistent with the results 
in Hervouet and Trommetter (2017), where spillovers have a positive impact on sharing 
knowledge when firms have heterogenous seed technology and one competitor has low existing 
seed technology. Hervouet and Trommetter (2017) results show that more competition between 
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biotech firms results in less knowledge being shared. This is consistent in the simultaneous 
research game because the private firm invests less in soybean breeding when SPG selects 
biotech traits and has competitive existing seed technology. 
To prevent crowding out, SPG may want to enter the market before the private firm. This 
would allow the private firm to set their investment conditional on SPG investment. Letting SPG 
enter the soybean market before the private firm may also prevent any holdup problems in 
soybean breeding. If SPG decides to invest first, the private firm’s optimal investment changes 
because they maximize their profits conditional on SPG’s level of investment. This is defined as 
the SPG Led Stackelberg game and is described in the next section of this chapter. 
4.4 Solving the first Stage of the SPG Led Stackelberg Game  
The SPG Led Stackelberg game now lets the private firm react to SPG investment in the 
first stage of the game. This is a sequential game because investment is now an element of time 
and SPG invests before the private firm. In the SPG Led Stackelberg game, SPG and the private 
firm still set quantity simultaneously in the second stage. Quantity cannot be modelled as 
Stackelberg due to concavity issues in SPG’s objective function. Nevertheless, SPG has the same 
objective function and reaction function as seen in the Simultaneous Research game. In equation 
4.21, the private firm maximizes profits subject to investment conditional on SPG investment.  
(4.21) max
𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝜋𝑃𝑉 =
൭𝛼𝑃𝑉−𝛾
8𝜅𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ൫2−𝛾2൯
2
+𝛼𝑃𝑉൫𝛾−2𝛾
3൯
8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28
൱
2
(2−𝛾2)2
− 4(𝛼𝑃𝑉 − 𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 )2 
 Equation 4.22 shows the first order condition from the private firm’s profit maximization 
problem. Equation 4.23 shows that the second order condition is negative for all degrees of 
substitutability. This means that the objective function results in a maximum. 
(4.22) −
8൬𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 (4𝜅𝛾൫5𝛾4−17𝛾2+14൯−൫8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28൯
2
)+𝛼𝑃𝑉൫64𝛾
8−528𝛾6+1512𝛾4−1778𝛾2+735൯൰
(8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28)2
= 0  
(4.23) 
8൫7−5𝛾2൯
2
(8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28)2
− 8 < 0 
 The SPG Led Stackelberg equilibrium investment function for the private firm is shown 
in equation 4.24. In a Stackelberg game, the reaction function only exists for the firm first to act. 
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Because the private firm maximizes profits conditional on SPG investment, the SPNE for private 
investment is readily solved. 
In equation 4.24, the difference in the level of existing seed technology has a negative 
impact on optimal private investment. If SPG and private soybeans are not substitutes, the 
difference in the level of existing technology has trivial impact on optimal private investment. 
This means that the degree of substitutability increases the impact SPG investment has on private 
investment. 
(4.24) 𝛼𝑃𝑉
∗ =
𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 ൬൫8𝛾4−33𝛾2+28൯
2
−4𝜅𝛾൫5𝛾4−17𝛾2+14൯൰
64𝛾8−528𝛾6+1512𝛾4−1778𝛾2+735
 
SPG’s equilibrium investment function is solved by substituting the private firm’s 
equilibrium investment function into SPG’s reaction function. This results in the SPNE for SPG 
optimal investment. Equation 4.25 shows equilibrium investment function for SPG. In the SPG 
Led Stackelberg game, a better level of existing seed technology for SPG always has a positive 
impact on SPG investment. This means that SPG invests more when they have competitive seed 
technology. The change in SPG investment remains to be greater for food-edible traits when they 
have uncompetitive existing seed technology, in comparison to biotech traits where the change is 
negative. These are the same results as shown in the three-dimensional graphs in the 
Simultaneous Research game. 
(4.25) 𝛼𝑆𝑃𝐺
∗ =
𝛼𝑃𝑉
𝑜 (4𝜅൫16𝛾8−130𝛾6+379𝛾4−471𝛾2+210൯−൫16𝛾7−74𝛾5+89𝛾3−28𝛾൯)
64𝛾8−528𝛾6+1512𝛾4−1778𝛾2+735
 
4.3.0 SPG Led Stackelberg Comparative Statics 
The comparative statics in the SPG Led Stackelberg game examines how the difference 
in the level of existing seed technology (𝜅) and the degree of substitutability (𝛾) impact private 
investment, SPG investment, private profits and farmer welfare for when SPG is the first to enter 
the soybean market. Again, SPG may want to enter the soybean market before the private firm to 
prevent a holdup problem. 
Figure 4.5 shows the optimal price, quantity and investment for SPG and the private firm 
by the proportional difference in the level of existing seed technology under different degrees of 
substitutability. The results in the SPG Led Stackelberg game are identical to the Simultaneous 
Research game where private price, quantity, and investment reduces when SPG has competitive 
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technology and selects biotech traits. This suggests that SPG reduces private price, quantity, and 
investment even when they enter the soybean market before the private firm. 
Figure 4.5: SPG Led Stackelberg game private and SPG optimal price, quantity, and 
investment with respect to the proportional difference in the level of existing seed 
technology (𝜿) and the degree of substitutability (𝜸) (𝜶𝑷𝑽
𝒐 = 𝟏𝟎) 
 
Source: Author 
Figure 4.6 shows the impact of the difference in the level of existing seed technology on 
private profits and farmer welfare in the SPG Led Stackelberg game. If SPG enters the market 
first, the private firm does not enter when SPG selects biotech traits and competitive seed 
technology (panel (a), figure 4.6). However, private profits are greater when SPG has 
uncompetitive existing seed technology and invests in biotech traits (panel (a), figure 4.5). If 
SPG has competitive technology and invests in food-edible traits, the private firm enters the 
soybean market and is not crowded out.  For all degrees of substitutability, farmer welfare is 
greatest when SPG has a competitive level of existing seed technology (panel (b), figure 4.5). 
The SPG Led Stackelberg game results are all consistent with the Simultaneous Research game. 
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Figure 4.6: SPG Led Stackelberg game private profits and farmer welfare with respect to 
the proportional difference in the level of existing seed technology (𝜿) and the degree of 
substitutability (𝜸) (𝜶𝑷𝑽
𝒐 = 𝟏𝟎) 
 
Source: Author 
4.3.2 SPG Led Stackelberg Game Conclusion 
The results of the SPG Led Stackelberg game suggest that SPG’s decision to invest 
before the private firm provides similar results on crowding effects and welfare as seen in the 
Simultaneous Research game. This makes sense because if SPG enters with traits that crowd out 
the private firm as seen in the Simultaneous Research game, the private firm is still crowded out 
regardless of whether they choose to invest first or simultaneously. The comparison of results 
between the Simultaneous Research game and SPG Led Stackelberg game are discussed in the 
policy implications and conclusions section in more detail. 
4.4 Policy Implications and Conclusions 
In western Canada, investment in soybean breeding is becoming more important as 
soybean adoption increases. The two-stage game shows that farmer welfare is greatest when SPG 
invests in biotech traits and has competitive seed technology (column 4, table 4.0). However, this 
crowds out the private firm reducing their profits to zero. If SPG invests in food edible traits, 
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farmer welfare and social welfare are relatively high when SPG has competitive seed technology 
(column 3, table 4.0). The private firm’s profits are greatest and farmer welfare is the lowest if 
SPG invests in biotech traits with uncompetitive seed technology (column 2, table 4.0). Private 
profits are positive when SPG has uncompetitive technology and invests in food edible traits, but 
social welfare is the lowest in this case (column 1, table 4.0).  
Table 4.0: Strategic Investment Strategy Outcomes 
  [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
Parameter/Estimate Game 
Food edible/ 
Uncompetitive 
Technology 
Biotech/ 
Uncompetitive 
Technology  
 Food edible/ 
Competitive 
Technology 
Biotech/  
Competitive 
Technology 
𝛾=0.1; 𝜅=0.1 𝛾=0.9; 𝜅=0.1  𝛾=0.1; 𝜅=0.9 𝛾=0.9; 𝜅=0.9 
Private Price/Quantity 
Simultaneous 
Research game 5.30 9.17 4.81 0 
SPG Led 
Stackelberg game 5.30 9.50 4.81 0 
SPG Quantity 
Simultaneous 
Research game 0.63 0 9.84 17.67 
SPG Led 
Stackelberg game 0.65 0 9.86 17.40 
Private Investment 
Simultaneous 
Research game 
10.67 11.80 10.60 10.00 
SPG Led 
Stackelberg game 
10.67 12.20 10.60 10.00 
SPG Investment 
Simultaneous 
Research game 
1.16 1.00 10.32 15.02 
SPG Led 
Stackelberg game 
1.18 1.00 10.34 14.85 
Private Profits 
Simultaneous 
Research game 
26.33 70.95 21.68 0.00 
SPG Led 
Stackelberg game 
26.32 70.80 21.67 0.00 
Farmer Welfare 
Simultaneous 
Research game 
14.59 12.11 64.73 132.68 
SPG Led 
Stackelberg game 
14.61 12.84 64.92 129.21 
Social Welfare 
Simultaneous 
Research game 
40.92 83.06 86.41 132.68 
SPG Led 
Stackelberg game 
40.92 83.65 86.59 129.21 
Source: Author's Estimates 
SPG’s main objective is to maximize farmer welfare, regardless of whether they crowd 
out the private firm. In this case, they should invest in biotech soybeans when they have 
competitive seed technology. However, SPG can reduce crowding effects, if required by 
47 
 
government regulation, by reducing their level of investment and/or lowering their level of 
existing seed technology. This is shown in columns 2 of table 4.0 where private profits increase 
in which SPG lowers their level of existing seed technology. However, SPG does not produce 
any quantity in this case and gives up breeding, handing over the soybean market to the private 
firm. In column 3 of table 4.0, private profits increase by SPG lowering their degree of 
substitutability with private varieties. In this case, SPG still produces a positive quantity of seed 
without crowding out the private firm. These results apply to both games and does not matter 
whether SPG is the first to invest in soybean breeding or simultaneously with the private firm. 
If SPG is restricted by government to select a strategy that does not crowd out the private 
firm, they should invest in food edible traits. This investment strategy is likely to have spillover 
effects from SPG developing better soybean germplasm and increasing the level of existing seed 
technology. This statement is supported by Hervouet and Trommetter (2017) where 
heterogeneity in products remain to have positive spillover effects, but, reduce the negative 
externalities from competition when sharing knowledge. 
Because the two-stage game is a simple stylized model, the next chapter develops a 
simulation to quantify the benefit to farmers from SPG investing in soybean breeding in western 
Canada. The simulation is an empirical model, as opposed to a theoretical model, that uses data 
on acres, yield, investment, prices, and costs to simulate the growth in acres and yield over 
twenty years, under a number of specific pricing and investment choices.  
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Chapter 5 Simulation 
5.0 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 1, with the increase in soybean acres in Saskatchewan, SPG must 
make some important investment decision based on their interests and goals in soybean breeding. 
As described in chapter 3, if SPG decides not to invest in breeding, the hold-up problem and lack 
of private investment reduces welfare for farmers in western Canada. In chapter 4, the game 
theoretic models explore how optimal investment would change depending on SPG’s investment 
strategy. We found that while these results provide important insights as to how SPG and the 
private sector may interact in the market place, SPG is faced with an important and difficult 
decision of whether to invest millions of dollars of levy income in breeding producer owned 
soybean varieties. The leadership and growers they represent need to understand more than just 
the theoretical effects of such a move. They need to be able to anticipate and quantify 
foreseeable outcomes from alternative investment strategies. 
The purpose of the simulation, which is described in this chapter, is to quantify how 
alternate hypothetical investments in soybean breeding impact private profits, farmer welfare, 
and social welfare. 
This will involve quantifying the likely impact of investment on yields, soybean seed 
prices, and in turn the impacts on gross margins, market shares and the overall growth of the 
soybean industry. To reduce the myriad of possible investment and pricing strategies, we 
consider three fixed investment rates, three levels of substitutability, three pricing levels, two 
research spillover environments, and two equity funded environments. In contrast to the two-
stage game where firms select their investment level, we examine the impact of investment while 
imposing realistic constraints on how much funds SPG and the private market can allocate to a 
soybean breeding program. The results of these simulations have important policy implications 
for SPG and their decision to invest and select traits in soybean breeding.  
The model simulates 20 years of investment in soybean breeding. Here SPG competes 
against a “private market”, rather one-on-one (i.e. SPG vs. the private firm), as modelled in the 
extensive form game and two-stage game. The simulation uses a multi-crop producer surplus 
function to derive the elasticities between SPG and private soybeans, and other crops. This new 
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functional form allows us to model the seed demand framework in ways that can be 
parameterized using industry and academic data. 
Throughout this chapter, we quantify soybean yield, price, cost and acres for SPG using 
conventional soybeans and quantify private yield, price, cost, and acres with roundup ready 
soybeans. This is because traditionally, producer groups have used conventional breeding 
methods, while the private market has used biotechnology to breed seed. However, this does not 
imply that SPG will follow this course, and we simulate a range of options. Importantly, roundup 
ready is a registered trademark for the roundup ready trait (glyphosate tolerant) owned by 
Monsanto. Most of the private market soybean varieties contain this trait. 
 This chapter begins with the Methodology section, section 5.1, which derives the own and 
cross acreage elasticities from the multi-crop producer surplus function. Section 5.2, Data 
Description and Base Parameters, describes the data and base parameters section and explains 
the specification for yield response to investment and spillover effects. Section 5.3, Simulation 
Results, provides the results for the simulation varying by substitutability. Section 5.4, Sensitivity 
Analysis, includes a sensitivity analysis to examine how the acreage elasticity, spillover effects, 
price, and investment impact economic surplus. This is followed by section 5.5, the Summary 
and Conclusions section. 
5.1 Methodology 
5.1.0 Introduction 
In this section, we describe the simulation model, which incorporates an acreage response 
function to changes in genetic yield and price, parameterized using existing empirical estimates 
and theoretical constraints. For each year of the simulation model, we use the acreage response 
function to estimate the partial equilibrium demands for SPG and private market soybeans as a 
function of the genetic yield index and seed price for 20 years. These market equilibria are in 
turn used to estimate the impact on gross margins, welfare and overall growth of the soybean 
industry.  
Figure 5.0 illustrates how the simulation captures the economic effects of breeding 
investment using a partial equilibrium model. In this partial equilibrium model, breeding 
increases the genetic yield index and shifts the demand for soybeans outwards in each period.  
In the first and second investment period, SPG and the private market both invest in 
soybean breeding. This increases the genetic yield index, shifting the demand for seed (𝐷) 
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outwards in the next time period. When holding price (𝑃) and marginal cost (𝑀𝐶) constant, 
investment increases the quantity of seed farmers purchase from SPG and the private market.  In 
figure 5.0, the green shaded area represents the positive change in farmer welfare, whereas the 
blue shaded area represents the positive change in private profits. Because total acres are fixed, 
there is a reduction in the demand for seed of other crops (𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐶), when the quantity of seed 
increases in the soybean market (𝑄𝑆𝑃𝐺; 𝑄𝑃𝑉). The red shaded area in this market represents the 
negative change in farmer welfare. Using this theoretical model as the basis for the simulation, 
we are able calculate the per period benefit and net present value to farmers and private 
companies, for various investment, pricing, and substitutability scenarios. Comparing these 
scenarios provides important policy implications for SPG and their decision to invest in soybean 
breeding. 
Figure 5.0: Simulation Model in a Partial Equilibrium Framework
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The partial equilibrium model in figure 5.0 is incorporated with a forward-looking 
simulation that contains additional conditions set out to quantify the change in soybean demand 
from investment in breeding. When defining parameters in the simulation, it is essential to ensure 
realistic decisions, rules, and outcomes for SPG and the private market. 
As an overview of the simulation model, a simple flow chart is shown in figure 5.1. For 
each step in the simulation, we provide a list of conditions undertaken in performing specific 
calculations. 
Importantly, the Simulation Parameterization is not a part of the simulation model. Prior 
to running the simulation, we first derive the own and cross acreage response gross margins 
elasticities and estimate the yield response to investment and spillover rate functions. To form 
defendable estimates of the partial equilibrium outcomes, it is critically important that we 
parameterize the acreage response elasticities from previous empirical studies. These studies 
show that the elasticities are internally consistent with symmetry and adding up conditions 
(Chavas and Holt, 1990). We also impose a degree of substitutability parameter on the SPG and 
the private market soybean acreage response gross margins elasticities. The yield response to 
investment and spillover rate functions are estimated using academic and industry data. Both 
functions estimate an annual yield growth for investment in breeding, and with the acreage 
response elasticities, quantify the shift in demand for soybean seed. 
After these parameters have been quantified, we are able to define commands that are 
needed to run the simulation model in Simulation Process.  
The simulation model computes the change in acres, yield, gross margins, private profits, 
farmer welfare, and social welfare for 20 years of investment. The simulation process involves 
five steps, 
The first step of the simulation model is to estimate private profits, farmer welfare and 
social welfare in the first year. Data for acres, yield, price, and cost, provided by industry and 
academic sources in the 2017 crop year, are used in the first year. In the next step, we calculate 
SPG’s and the private market’s level of investment in soybean breeding, which is then used to 
estimate the yield response to investment and spillover rate. The genetic yield gains from 
investment provide farmers with an expected gross margin for improved soybean seed in the 
following year. The third step is to estimate the change in soybean acres in the next year using 
the acreage response gross margins elasticities. In the fourth step, we loop the first three steps for 
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nineteen years and stop at year 20 in the simulation. In the fifth step, we obtain the simulated 
results for twenty years of investment in soybean breeding and estimate the net present value of 
private profits, farmer welfare, and social welfare. Once we have completed the simulation for 
the base case, we then simulate alternate SPG investment and pricing policies. We are able to 
assess the economic impacts of these policies by comparing the outcomes to the base case. 
In Section 5.1, we derive the own and cross acreage response gross margins elasticities 
using a multi-crop producer surplus function, Hotelling’s Lemma, Young’s Theorem, and adding 
up conditions. This is followed by the Data Description and Base Parameters section, which 
shows the simulation data and base parameters, and estimates the yield response to investment 
and spillover rate functions. 
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Figure 5.1: Simulation Flow Chart of Estimation Procedure with Conditions
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5.1.1 Multi-Crop Producer Surplus Constrained Maximization Problem 
In the multi-crop producer surplus function, farmers’ objective is to maximize their 
surplus subject to acres and inputs of private market roundup ready soybeans, SPG conventional 
soybeans, and other crops. The objective function in equation 5.1 incorporates a yield index to 
control for the diminishing returns by acres and inputs of a specific crop. This assumption 
prevents a farmer from seeding their whole farm to a crop with the highest gross margins. In this 
model, we assume that the realized yield decreases when farmers begin to allocate an excessive 
amount of acres and inputs to a particular crop. We find this to be an appropriate assumption 
because using too much fertilizer or seed can reduce the yield of a crop. Also, allocating too 
much of your farmable acres to a particular crop has a negative impact on realized yield because 
of the poor crop rotation and management that could further increase soil nutrient deficiencies, 
salinity, weed pressure, and disease risk. The notation in equation 5.1 is standard throughout the 
rest of this chapter. SPG soybeans are denoted by i, private market soybeans are denoted by j, 
and other crops are denoted by k. 
(5.1) max
𝐴𝑛,𝑥𝑛
𝑃𝑆 = ∑ [𝑃𝑛𝑦𝑛 − 𝑤𝑛𝑥𝑛]𝐴𝑛𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘       𝑠. 𝑡.    ∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘  = ?̅? 
Where: 𝑛 ∈  {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘} 
 𝑃𝑛 = output price of crop n 
 𝑦𝑛 =realized yield of crop n 
 𝑤𝑛 =input cost of crop n 
 𝑥𝑛 =level of inputs of crop n 
 𝐴𝑛 =acres of crop n 
 ?̅? =total acres  
 Equation 5.2 defines the realized yield as being dependent on the yield index, and the 
proportion/level of inputs and acres of each crop. In this equation, 𝑘(∙) is a function of the inputs 
and acres of all crops. 
(5.2) 𝑦𝑛 = ?̂?𝑛 ∙ 𝑘(𝒙, 𝑨)      𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒      𝒙 ∈ ൫𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑥𝑘൯     𝑎𝑛𝑑      𝑨 ∈ ൫𝐴𝑖 , 𝐴𝑗 , 𝐴𝑘൯ 
Where: 
 ?̂?𝑛 =genetic yield index of crop n 
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To ensure an internal solution where all crops are grown with finite yield, we assume 
diminishing returns with respect to the level of inputs and acres. This is shown in equation 5.3, 
where the function 𝑘(∙) decreases with respect to acres and inputs. 
 (5.3) 
𝜕𝑘(𝒙,𝑨)
𝜕𝐴𝑛
< 0   𝑎𝑛𝑑   
𝜕𝑘(𝒙,𝑨)
𝜕𝑥𝑛
< 0 
 In equation 5.4, we substitute the reduced form realized yield into the producer surplus 
maximization problem. 
(5.4) max
𝐴𝑛,𝑥𝑛
𝑃𝑆 = ∑ [𝑃𝑛?̂?𝑛 ∙ 𝑘(𝒙, 𝑨) − 𝑤𝑛𝑥𝑛]𝐴𝑛𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘       𝑠. 𝑡.    ∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘  = ?̅? 
 To solve the maximization problem for acres and inputs with the land constraint, we use a 
LaGrange, which solves for a constrained maximization problem. This is shown in equation 5.5. 
(5.5) max
𝐴𝑛,𝑥𝑛
 ℒ = ∑ [𝑃𝑛?̂?𝑛 ∙ 𝑘(𝒙, 𝑨) − 𝑤𝑛𝑥𝑛]𝐴𝑛 − 𝜆൫∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 − ?̅?൯𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘  
 The First Order Conditions (FOCs) from the constrained maximization problem are 
shown in equations 5.5 to 5.7. 
FOCs: 
(5.5) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐴𝑛
= ∑ 𝑃𝑛?̂?𝑛 ∙ 𝑘
′(𝒙, 𝑨)𝐴𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛?̂?𝑛 ∙ 𝑘(𝒙, 𝑨)𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑤𝑛𝑥𝑛 − 𝜆 = 0 
(5.6) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑥𝑛
= ∑ 𝑃𝑛?̂?𝑛 ∙ 𝑘
′(𝒙, 𝑨)𝐴𝑛 − 𝑤𝑛𝐴𝑛 =𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 0 
(5.7) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜆
= ∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 − ?̅? = 0 
 By algebraic isolation, the FOCs solve for the producer surplus maximizing output 
supply, input demand, and acreage supply functions. In equations 5.8 to 5.10, the optimal output 
supply, input demand, and acreage supply all reduce and depend on the output price, yield index, 
input price, and total acres. 
(5.8) 𝑦𝑛
∗ = ?̂?𝑛 ∙ 𝑘൫𝑃𝑛, ?̂?𝑛, 𝑤𝑛, ?̅?൯ 
(5.9) 𝑥𝑛
∗ = 𝑥𝑛൫𝑃𝑛, ?̂?𝑛, 𝑤𝑛, ?̅?൯ 
(5.10) 𝐴𝑛
∗ = 𝐴𝑛൫𝑃𝑛, ?̂?𝑛, 𝑤𝑛, ?̅?൯ 
 Substituting equations 5.8 to 5.10 back into the multi-crop producer surplus function 
solves for the indirect producer surplus function in reduced form. The indirect producer surplus 
function is shown in equation 5.11. 
 (5.11) 𝑃𝑆∗ = 𝑃𝑆൫𝑃𝑛, ?̂?𝑛, 𝑤𝑛, ?̅?൯ 
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 By Hotelling’s Lemma, the output supply and input demand are solved by deriving with 
respect to output and input price. Hotelling’s Lemma applied to the indirect producer surplus 
function is shown in equations 5.12 and 5.13.  
(5.12) 
𝜕𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝑃𝑛
= 𝑦𝑛
∗ 
(5.13) −
𝜕𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝑤𝑛
= 𝑥𝑛
∗  
 In equation 5.14, defining the gross margin index for a farmer as price times the yield 
index makes it possible to solve for the acreage supply. 
(5.14) 𝐺𝑛 = 𝑃𝑛?̂?𝑛 
 Because the gross margin index is exogenous to the firm, we can derive producer surplus 
maximizing acreage supply as a function of 𝐺𝑛, 𝑤𝑛and ?̅?. Because of Young’s Theorem, we 
know that price effects on 𝑦𝑛
∗ are symmetric (equation 5.15). However, the price effects on  𝐴𝑛
∗  
cannot be symmetric unless the yield per acre is invariant to prices, which they are not. That 
being said, we make the argument that acreage response effects are approximately symmetric 
because yield per acre are nearly invariant to prices (equations 5.16 and 5.17). For modeling 
purposes, we assume that acreage response is similar to supply response, and is symmetric. The 
sum of acreage responses from a price or yield index change must sum to zero because land is 
fixed (equation 5.18). 
(5.15) 
𝜕2𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝜕𝑃𝑗
=
𝜕𝑦𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑃𝑗
               and                  
𝜕2𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝑃𝑗𝜕𝑃𝑖
=
𝜕𝑦𝑗
∗
𝜕𝑃𝑖
    
(5.16) 
𝜕2𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝑃𝑖?̂?𝑖𝜕𝑃𝑗
≈
𝜕𝐴𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑃𝑗
           and               
𝜕2𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝑃𝑗?̂?𝑗𝜕𝑃𝑖
≈
𝜕𝐴𝑗
∗
𝜕𝑃𝑖
   
(5.17) 
𝜕2𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝑃𝑖?̂?𝑖𝜕?̂?𝑗
≈
𝜕𝐴𝑖
∗
𝜕?̂?𝑗
           and                
𝜕2𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝑃𝑗?̂?𝑗𝜕?̂?𝑖
≈
𝜕𝐴𝑗
∗
𝜕?̂?𝑖
   
(5.18) ∑
𝜕𝐴𝑛
∗
𝜕𝑃𝑛
= 0𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘         and               ∑
𝜕𝐴𝑛
∗
𝜕?̂?𝑛
= 0𝑛∈𝑖,𝑗,𝑘  
The optimal acreage supply, as shown in equation 5.19, is approximately solved by 
Hotelling’s Lemma, given that price is nearly invariant to the yield index. 
(5.19) 
𝜕𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝐺𝑛
=
𝜕𝑃𝑆∗
𝜕𝑃𝑛?̂?𝑛
≈ 𝐴𝑛
∗  
 Because the gross margin index is a product of price and the yield index, the price 
elasticity, the yield index elasticity, and the gross margin index elasticity are identical. 
(5.20) 𝑒?̂?𝑛 =
𝜕𝐴𝑛
∗
𝜕?̂?𝑛
?̂?𝑛
𝐴𝑛
 ≈  𝑒𝑃𝑛 =
𝜕𝐴𝑛
∗
𝜕𝑃𝑛
𝑃𝑛
𝐴𝑛
   ≈   𝑒𝐺𝑛 =
𝜕𝐴𝑛
∗
𝜕𝐺𝑛
𝐺𝑛
𝐴𝑛
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5.1.2 Gross Margin Own and Cross Acreage Elasticities 
The gross margins index elasticity presented in the previous section is used to estimate 
the own and cross acreage elasticities with restrictions. In the simulation model, gross margins 
increase when the yield index increases from investment in soybean breeding. Own and cross 
acreage elasticities are estimated assuming homogeneity of degree zero. This assumption is 
enforced by the land constraint meaning that the overall change in acres must sum to zero. 
Homogeneity of degree zero assumes that the proportion of soybean acres relative to total acres 
is constant when all crop prices change proportionally. Chavas and Holt (1990) show that the 
homogeneity condition implies acreage decisions are determined by relative prices and costs. In 
equation 5.21, the homogeneity condition is defined in the acreage response matrix. 
(5.21) [
𝛾𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝑗𝑖 𝛾𝑘𝑖
𝛾𝑖𝑗 𝛾𝑗𝑗 𝛾𝑘𝑗
𝛾𝑖𝑘 𝛾𝑗𝑘 𝛾𝑘𝑘
] = [
0
0
0
] 
Where: 𝛾𝑛𝑛 =
𝜕𝐴𝑛
∗
𝜕𝐺𝑛
 
 By Young’s Theorem, we can state that the acreage response to a change in the gross 
margin index are approximately symmetric. This is shown in equations 5.22 to 5.24. 
(5.22) 𝛾𝑖𝑗 ≈ 𝛾𝑗𝑖 
(5.23) 𝛾𝑖𝑘 ≈ 𝛾𝑘𝑖 
(5.24) 𝛾𝑗𝑘 ≈ 𝛾𝑘𝑗 
 Multiplying the equation 5.22 to 5.24 by  
𝐺𝑛
𝐴𝑛
𝐴𝑛
𝐺𝑛
 results in the following elasticity 
relationships, given by symmetry, which are shown in equations 5.25 to 5.27. 
(5.25) 𝑒𝑗𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑗
𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑗
 
(5.26) 𝑒𝑘𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝑘
𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑘
𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑘
 
(5.27) 𝑒𝑘𝑗 = 𝑒𝑗𝑘
𝐴𝑗
𝐴𝑘
𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑘
 
 Multiplying 𝛾𝑛𝑛 by 
𝐺𝑛
𝐴𝑛
𝐴𝑛
𝐺𝑛
 into the matrix in equation 5.21 results in the product of the own 
and cross acreage elasticities and acres divided by the gross margins index. This result is shown 
in equation 5.28. 
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(5.28) 
[
 
 
 
 𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝑖
𝐺𝑖
𝑒𝑗𝑖
𝐴𝑗
𝐺𝑖
𝑒𝑘𝑖
𝐴𝑘
𝐺𝑖
𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑖
𝐺𝑗
𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝐴𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝑒𝑘𝑗
𝐴𝑘
𝐺𝑗
𝑒𝑖𝑘
𝐴𝑖
𝐺𝑘
𝑒𝑗𝑘
𝐴𝑗
𝐺𝑘
𝑒𝑘𝑘
𝐴𝑘
𝐺𝑘]
 
 
 
 
= [
0
0
0
] 
From equation 5.28, the remaining elasticity relationships are solved by assuming 
homogeneity, as shown in equations 5.29 to 5.31. 
(5.29) −𝑒𝑗𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑗
+ 𝑒𝑘𝑖
𝐴𝑘
𝐴𝑗
 
(5.30) −𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝐴𝑗
𝐴𝑖
+ 𝑒𝑘𝑗
𝐴𝑘
𝐴𝑖
 
(5.31) −𝑒𝑖𝑘 = 𝑒𝑘𝑘
𝐴𝑘
𝐴𝑖
+ 𝑒𝑗𝑘
𝐴𝑗
𝐴𝑖
 
The simulated acreage elasticities are estimated with gross margins data, acreage data, 
and a proxy pea acreage elasticity for expected profits from Bakhshi and Gray (2012). However, 
because only one elasticity is given, a within-group assumption is needed to simulate the 
underlying elasticities. This is performed on an iterative process in which aggregated elasticities 
are estimated assuming homogeneity and symmetry. 
By the Euler’s Theorem, we can assume that the sum of own and cross price elasticities is 
zero, as shown in equation 5.32 (Chiang, 1984).  
Euler’s Theorem: 
(5.32) 0 =
𝜕𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑖
𝐴𝑖
+
𝜕𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝐴𝑖
+
𝜕𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑘
𝐺𝑘
𝐴𝑖
          and           0 =
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝐴𝑗
+
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑖
𝐴𝑗
+
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑘
𝐺𝑘
𝐴𝑗
 
In equation 5.33, the within-group assumption assumes that the acreage response for all 
soybeans is close to the same, regardless of the variety. In equation 5.34, the within-group 
assumption also assumes that the acreage effects on all soybean varieties from other crops are 
nearly the same.  
Within-Group Assumption: 
(5.33) 
𝜕𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑖
𝐴𝑖
≈
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝐴𝑗
 
(5.34) 
𝜕𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑘
𝐺𝑘
𝐴𝑖
≈
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑘
𝐺𝑘
𝐴𝑗
 
When using the within-group assumption with the land constraint, we aggregate the own 
and cross elasticities from other crops. Equation 5.35 shows the intermediate step of reducing the 
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within-group assumption via Euler’s Theorem. The final relationship assumes that the own and 
cross acreage effects within soybeans must sum to zero, as shown in equation 5.36. 
Euler’s Theorem and Within-Group Assumption: 
(5.35) 
𝜕𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑖
𝐴𝑖
+
𝜕𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝐴𝑖
+ ൬
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝐴𝑗
+
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑖
𝐴𝑗
൰ ≈ 0 
(5.36) 2
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝐴𝑗
+
𝜕𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝐴𝑖
+
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑖
𝐴𝑗
≈ 0 
The within-group assumption and homogeneity condition derive the elasticity calculation, 
as shown in equation 5.37. Given equation 5.37, we obtain two unknowns and two equations to 
solve for the within-group elasticities. In equation 5.37, the cross elasticity, 𝑒𝑖𝑗 or 𝑒𝑗𝑖, is lagged 
by a year to avoid loops in the calculation. In the next sub-section, we model a substitutability 
parameter on the cross acreage response soybean elasticities (𝑒𝑗𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑗
𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑗
) to simulate how the 
degree of substitutability between conventional and roundup ready soybeans impacts the 
simulation results. 
Because the elasticities estimated from equation 5.37 do not represent the underlying 
elasticities in the simulation model and aggregate own and cross acreage effects from other 
crops. After the model has been simulated, the underlying elasticities in each year are calculated 
with the simulation model. This is done by calculating the percentage change in acres from a 
percentage change in the gross margins index for a given year. Because this process is timely, the 
elasticities in the simulation are only provided for year one, 10, and 19. 
Elasticity Calculation: 
 (5.37) 𝑒𝑗𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑗
𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑗
        𝑠. 𝑡.     0 = 2
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝐴𝑗
+
𝜕𝐴𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑗
𝐴𝑖
+
𝜕𝐴𝑗
𝜕𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝑖
𝐴𝑗
 
5.1.3 The Degree of Substitutability 
In the simulation model, the degree of substitutability is parameterized for conventional 
and roundup ready soybeans. In many cases, conventional and roundup ready varieties may 
generate similar gross margins, but have different acreages. Equation 5.38 shows the 
substitutability constraint, in which the level of substitutability between SPG and private 
soybeans is defined by λ. This parameter weights the ratio of acres and gross margins by the 
level of substitutability.  
In many respects, the gross margins for a specific crop may be high, such as hybrid fall 
rye, but the demand is limited. High paying crops like hybrid fall rye may be undesired because 
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of tastes and preferences, which are influenced by factors of weed control, seeding time, 
storability, and marketability in specific crop regions.  
If two varieties were equivalent, the acreage decision should only depend on the gross 
margins, which results in a proportional acreage response for equal gross margins. This 
parametric insertion makes it possible to alter roundup ready and conventional cross acreage 
elasticities depending on whether SPG selects food edible traits (λ = 0), conventional traits (λ =
0.5), or biotech traits (λ = 1). SPG’s decision to invest in these traits impacts the degree of 
substitutability between their soybeans and private roundup ready soybeans.   
 (5.38) 
𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑒𝑗𝑖
= (
𝐴𝑗
𝐴𝑖
)
(1−𝜆)
(
𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑖
)
𝜆
 
Where: λ = the degree of substitutability between SPG conventional and private roundup 
ready soybeans 
In the simulation, there are three distinct cases as explained above that impact the degree 
of substitutability: 
1. Low Substitutability: In the first case, the degree of substitutability between SPG 
and private market soybeans is zero and SPG selects food edible traits (𝜆 = 0). The 
ratio of cross acreage elasticities depends only on the ratio of seeded acres, as shown 
in equation 5.39.  
(5.39) 
𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑒𝑗𝑖
=
𝐴𝑗
𝐴𝑖
 
2. Moderate Substitutability: In the second case, the degree of substitutability is 
moderate and SPG invests in conventional traits (𝜆 = 0.5). The ratio of cross acreage 
elasticities depends equally upon the ratio of seeded acres and gross margins, as 
shown in equation 5.40. In this case, the degree of substitutability in crop traits 
between conventional and roundup ready soybeans have been slightly relaxed.  
(5.40) 
𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑒𝑗𝑖
= (
𝐴𝑗
𝐴𝑖
)
0.5
(
𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑖
)
0.5
 
3. High Substitutability: In the third case, the degree of substitutability is high and 
SPG invests in biotech traits (𝜆 = 1). The ratio of cross acreage elasticities depends 
only on the ratio of gross margins, as shown in equation 5.41. When gross margins 
are the same, the cross elasticities result in proportional changes in acres for 
conventional and roundup ready soybeans. 
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(5.41) 
𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑒𝑗𝑖
=
𝐺𝑗
𝐺𝑖
 
 These three cases are simulated to estimate how SPG’s decision to invest in certain traits 
impact welfare and crowding effects over twenty years. The next section of this chapter 
describes the data and base parameters used in the simulation model. We also explain and 
estimate the functional form for yield response to investment and the spillover effects between 
SPG and the private market. 
5.2 Data Description and Base Parameters 
5.2.0 Base Parameters 
The values for all base parameters in the simulation are shown in table 5.0. This sub-
section explains the sources and calculations used to obtain the yield, chemical cost, seed cost, 
acreage elasticity, nitrogen benefit, discount rate, and welfare calculations. The data on how 
much each player can invest and the yield response to investment is discussed in the next section. 
Not discussed in this section are the acres, output price, gross margins, and fixed investment 
rates of each player, which are also shown in table 5.0. 
In table 5.0, the entry yield for SPG, quantified by conventional soybeans, is substantially 
lower than for private roundup ready soybeans. The cost of production for conventional and 
roundup ready soybeans are also different. Academic research finds that the cost of conventional 
soybeans, in terms of chemical, is much higher than for roundup ready soybeans. Gaban (2013) 
finds that under a low weed control level, the cost of herbicide is 8.39 dollars more per acre for 
variety 5601T (conventional) than for variety Allen (biotech). In the case where farmers desire 
high weed control and apply higher rates of herbicide, the difference is 12.87 dollars per acre. In 
the simulation, we calculate the conventional herbicide cost as being equal to 12.87 dollars per 
acres plus the biotech herbicide costs. An additional pre-burn off application of 3.90 dollars per 
acre for Heat is added to the herbicide cost for SPG conventional soybeans to control for 
volunteer canola (Beyond Agronomy, 2010). 
The cost for soybean seed depends on the seeding rate, which may vary across farms. In 
the simulation, we assume that farmers all seed at the same seeding rate. In table 5.0, the seeding 
rate for soybeans is assumed to be 76.92 pounds per acre, which is equivalent to seeding 200,000 
seeds per acre (Saskatchewan Pulse Growers, 2018). Producers are advised by their seed 
company to seed soybeans at 1.4 bags per acre, a rate of approximately 196,000 seeds per acre 
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(Heal, 2017). This rate determines the private price of soybean seed at 101.78 dollars per acre 
assuming a bag costs 60 dollars and seed treatment costs 12.70 dollars per bag (Bergsma, 2017; 
Heal, 2017; Slobodian, 2017). The cost of SPG conventional seed is 30.77 dollars per acre and is 
assumed to be the cost of selling seed in the simulation.1 Importantly, the seeding rate is constant 
throughout the simulation, and does not change with more productive seed technology. 
Table 5.0: Soybean Breeding Investment Simulation Base Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Value Source 
Output Price ($/bu) 10.7 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(2016)  
Roundup Ready Yield (bu/ac) 31.8 Saskatchewan Agriculture (2017) 
Conventional Yield (bu/ac) 24.36 Yield Manitoba (2017) 
Roundup Ready Seed Price ($/ac) 101.78 Bergsma (2017); Heal (2017); Slobodian (2017) 
Conventional Seed Price ($/ac) 30.77 Willms (2018) 
Roundup Ready Cost ($/ac) 127.35 Saskatchewan Agriculture (2017) 
Conventional Cost ($/ac) 144.12 Saskatchewan Agriculture (2017); Gaban (2013); Beyond 
Agronomy (2010) 
Nitrogen Benefit ($/ac) 35 Saskatchewan Agriculture (2017) 
Roundup Ready Gross Margins 
($/ac) 
146.13 Author’s Calculations 
Conventional Gross Margins 
($/ac) 
120.76 Author’s Calculations 
Other Crop Gross Margins ($/ac) 142.58 Adapted from Statistics Canada (2017b); Saskatchewan 
Agriculture (2017) 
Total Acres 61,166,469 Statistic Canada (2017a) 
Roundup Ready Acres 3,035,675 Statistics Canada (2017a) 
Conventional Acres 11,794 Yield Manitoba (2017) 
Seeding Rate (lb/ac) 76.92 Adapted from Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (2018) 
Soybean Acreage Elasticity 2.335 Adapted from Bakhshi and Gray (2012) 
Private Discount Rate 0.20 Author’s Estimate 
SPG Discount Rate 0.05 Author’s Estimate 
Checkoff Levy (%) 1 Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (2016) 
Private Investment (% of profits) 5 Author’s Estimate 
Number of Private Firms 11 Author’s Estimate 
Private Profit 204,785,118 Author’s Calculations 
Farmer Welfare 222,513,727 Author’s Calculations 
Social Welfare 427,298,845 Author’s Calculations 
Source: Author   
The acreage elasticity in table 5.0 is hypothetical and represents the percentage change in 
soybean acres from a percentage change in expected soybean gross margins. The acreage 
elasticity of 2.335 has been scaled by 25 from the pea acreage elasticity estimated in Bakhshi and 
Gray (2012) because the acreage response for soybeans is assumed to be higher than peas. A 
sensitivity analysis is conducted on the acreage elasticity in section 5.4 because the parameter is 
hypothetical and arbitrarily scaled. 
                                                          
1 SPG sells soybean seed royalty free to producers where the cost of selling seed is assumed to be the conventional seed price. 
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Additional parameters used in the simulation and their sources are shown in table 5.0. A 
nitrogen fixation benefit of 35 dollars is included in the gross margins for soybeans. This is 
added to the gross margins in the simulation and is approximately the average cost of nitrogen 
fertilizer for cereals and oilseeds (Saskatchewan Agriculture, 2017).  
5.2.1 Simulation Model Welfare Estimates 
In the simulation model, we calculate private profits, farmer welfare, and social welfare 
for each year using the partial equilibrium framework as seen in the Methodology section. We 
estimate the area in the soybean market that represents private profits, farmer welfare, and social 
welfare for each year. In equation 5.42, net private profits are equal to the price of seed per acre 
(p) multiplied by the acres of roundup ready seed (𝐴) minus the seed marketing costs (𝑐) and 
level of investment (C).  
(5.42) Π𝑗,𝑡 = ൫𝑝𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑗,𝑡൯𝐴𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑗,𝑡 
 Where: Π𝑗,𝑡 = net private market profits per year 
  𝑝𝑗,𝑡 = price of private market soybean seed per acre 
  𝑐𝑗,𝑡 = cost of marketing soybean seed per acre 
  𝐶𝑗,𝑡 = private market level of investment 
Farmer welfare only accounts for surplus in the soybean market, as shown in equation 
5.43. This equation represents the triangular area that is underneath both SPG and private market 
soybean seed demand curves and above the seed price (𝑝). Notably, we must solve for the 
reservation price for each soybean variety, which is the price of seed at zero quantity demanded. 
(5.43) 𝐹𝑊𝑡 = ൫?̅?𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑡൯ (
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
2
) + ൫?̅?𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑗,𝑡൯ (
𝐴𝑗,𝑡
2
) 
Where: 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = price of SPG soybean seed per acre 
?̅?𝑖,𝑡 = per period reservation price for SPG soybean seed per acre 
?̅?𝑗,𝑡 = per period reservation price for private market soybean seed per acre 
In the simulation model, we assume that farmers do not seed soybeans when their farm 
profit is equal to zero. Farm profits for SPG and private market soybeans are shown in equation 
5.44. Therefore, we estimate the reservation price at the seed price where farm profits are equal 
to zero.  
(5.44) 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡?̂?𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜋𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑗,𝑡?̂?𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑗,𝑡 
 Where: 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = SPG soybean farm profit per acre 
  𝜋𝑗,𝑡 = private market farm profit per acre 
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The cost of inputs for both SPG and private market soybeans are partitioned by the price 
of seed and the remainder of input costs, as shown in equation 5.45. By this separation, we are 
able to isolate the seed price when farm profits are equal to zero and solve for the reservation 
price. 
(5.45) 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑤𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗,𝑡 
 Where: 𝑣𝑖,𝑡= remainder of input costs per acre for SPG soybeans 
  𝑣𝑗,𝑡= remainder of input costs per acre for private market soybeans 
In equation 5.46, the reservation price is equal to the output price (𝑃) multiplied by the 
genetic yield index (?̅?) minus the remainder of input costs (𝑣). 
(5.46) ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡?̅?𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 and ?̅?𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑗,𝑡?̅?𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑣𝑗,𝑡 
 In the simulation model, we estimate social welfare simply as private profits plus farmer 
welfare in each year (equation 5.47). 
(5.47) 𝑆𝑊𝑡 = Π𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑊𝑡 
In table 5.0, using equations 5.42, 5.43, and 5.47, we calculate private profits, farmer 
welfare, and social welfare, for the first year of the simulation model. This is calculated with data 
on the output price, genetic yield index, and input costs. We are unable to calculate following 
years as this depends on the acreage response elasticities and yield response to investment and 
spillover rates. 
In the simulation model, we estimate the net present value of private profits with the 
industry standard discount rate of 20 percent. A social discount rate of five percent is used to 
calculate the net present value of farmer and social welfare. Boardman, Moore, and Vining 
(2008) find that five percent is an appropriate upper bound discount rate for public projects that 
have intergenerational impacts and the potential to crowd out private investment.  
5.2.2  Genetic Yield Response to Breeding Investment 
 In the simulation, SPG and the private market increase their soybean yield by investing in 
breeding. In contrast to the two-stage game, we assume that SPG and the private market have a 
fixed level of investment. This complements the extensive form game, in which we examine the 
long-term impact of investment, provided there are investment constraints that are given by how 
much funds SPG and the private market can realistically allocate to research and development. 
SPG’s level of investment in soybean breeding depends on the checkoff levy collected 
from the production of soybeans. The private market’s level of investment depends on their 
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percentage of profits allocated to soybean breeding research. The checkoff and percentage of 
profits used in the simulation are shown in table 5.0. 
 The yield response to investment has been estimated given data on industry expectations 
and academic research. From academic research, Rincker et al (2014) uses a statistical approach 
to estimate the annual change in yield from genetic improvement. The study examines yields 
from soybeans in maturity groups II, III, and IV across 15 sites in the United States. The 
cultivars in the study are owned by Monsanto, Syngenta, and Pioneer and use 80 years’ worth of 
data. Results show that the overall yield gains from genetic improvement are approximately 0.3 
to 0.5 bushels per acre per year (Rincker et al, 2014).  
In the simulation, yield response to investment is assumed to be logarithmic form, as 
illustrated in figure 5.2. Yield gains from breeding research are assumed to level off at higher 
investment. The logarithmic function provides a benchmark yield response for investment in 
soybean breeding. In the model, total private investment is divided by 11, which is the number of 
private firms. These companies include: Monsanto, Dow AgroSciences, DuPont Pioneer, Elite 
Seeds, NorthStar Genetics, Pride Seeds, Prograin, SeCan, Thunder Seed, Syngenta, and Brett 
Young Seeds. Notably, Dow AgroSciences and DuPont Pioneer have merged since the 
simulation was constructed.  
In figure 5.2, the logarithmic function is fitted on three data points. The first point is 
where 500,000 dollars invested per year results in a yield increase of 0.25 bushels per acre per 
year. Second, one million dollars invested per year results in a yield increase of 0.5 bushels per 
acre per year. Third, two million dollars invested per year results in a yield increase of one 
bushel per acre per year.  
Although the estimated yield growth in figure 5.2 is high in comparison to the results of 
Rincker et al (2014), industry breeders believe yield growth rates in Saskatchewan could be the 
same as yield gains experienced in Manitoba over the past decade (Delheimer, 2018; Lee, 2018). 
The yield growth from 2001 to 2017 in Manitoba is approximately one bushel per acre per year 
(Statistics Canada, 2017a).  
In the simulation, there is a seven-year lag for when yield gains are realized by SPG and 
the private market. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1982) assume that it takes roughly three years to 
develop and release a product after committing to research and development. Alston, Pardey, and 
Ruttan (2008) state that it takes approximately 5-10 years to breed a new variety. A natural 
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growth rate in the first seven years of the simulation is assumed to be 0.2974 bushels per acre per 
year, which is the average yield growth rate in Saskatchewan from 2013 to 2017 (Statistics 
Canada, 2017a). 
Figure 5.2: Yield Growth and Investment in Soybean Breeding 
 
Source: Author 
5.2.3 Spillover Effects 
In the simulation model, we quantify the research spillovers between SPG and the private 
market. We assume that research spillovers between SPG and the private market result in yield 
growth. Breeders acquire better seed technology by reverse engineering their competitor’s 
soybean varieties. This is also permitted in PBR’s where rival varieties can be used as a source of 
initial variation for seed (Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, 2015). The only cost to obtain a 
competitor’s knowledge is through investing in soybean breeding, which is like absorptive 
capacity. However, the spillover effects are only obtained by the player with the lower soybean 
yield. 
The spillover effects are modelled as convergence rates as in Sawka (2014). Sawka 
(2014) uses the convergence rates to model the narrowing of a percentage gap in lentil 
production between leading countries and developing countries. In the simulation, spillover 
effects are calculated as a percentage gap between the difference in SPG and private roundup 
ready yields. In figure 5.3, the spillover rate is estimated as a linear function of investment in 
soybean breeding. For two million dollars invested, 20% of the yield gap between varieties is 
obtained in yield growth for the next year. It is also important to note that only a percentage of 
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this technology is acquired each year, limiting a player’s ability to fully realize technology 
spillovers. 
Figure 5.3: Spillover rate as the percentage of yield gap between soybean varieties for 
investment in breeding 
 
Source: Author 
5.3 Simulation Results 
5.3.0 Introduction 
 This section provides the simulation model results, which include the yield, gross 
margins, yield growth, spillovers, investment, acres, and welfare in each year. Tables 5.1 to 5.6 
show the results over twenty years for each case of substitutability. Table 5.7 shows the own and 
cross acreage elasticities in year 10 for each degree of substitutability. Table 5.8 shows the net 
present value of private profits, farmer welfare, and social welfare for each degree of 
substitutability as well. 
5.3.1 Case 1 Results 
In the case of low substitutability, food edible soybean varieties are assumed to serve a 
different end-use market than roundup ready soybeans (𝜆 = 0). The results for case 1 are shown 
in tables 5.1 and 5.2. Table 5.1 shows the yield and gross margins for both food edible and 
roundup ready soybeans in all years. Food edible soybean yield surpasses roundup yield in year 
20, whereas food edible gross margins surpass roundup ready gross margins in year six. Even 
with roundup ready yield being higher than food edible yield, the low cost of food edible seed 
gives food edible soybeans a higher gross margin than roundup ready soybeans. Food edible 
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soybeans also acquire additional yield growth in beginning years from seed technology spillovers 
from the private market.  
Table 5.1: Case 1. Low Substitutable - Yield, Gross Margins, Yield Growth Results for 20 
Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding 
Year 
Roundup 
Ready Yield 
(bu/ac) 
Food Edible 
Yield (bu/ac) 
Roundup 
Ready Gross 
Margin ($/ac) 
Food Edible 
Gross Margin 
($/ac) 
Roundup 
Ready Yield 
Growth 
(bu/ac) 
Food Edible 
Yield Growth 
(bu/ac) 
PV Spillover 
Yield Growth 
(bu/ac) 
SPG Spillover 
Yield Growth 
(bu/ac) 
1 31.80 24.36 146.13 120.76 0.2974 0.2974 0.00 0.57 
2 32.10 25.23 149.31 130.05 0.2974 0.2974 0.00 0.58 
3 32.39 26.10 152.49 139.42 0.2974 0.2974 0.00 0.57 
4 32.69 26.97 155.68 148.70 0.2974 0.2974 0.00 0.56 
5 32.99 27.83 158.86 157.85 0.2974 0.2974 0.00 0.53 
6 33.29 28.66 162.04 166.75 0.57 0.57 0.00 0.51 
7 33.86 29.73 168.16 178.25 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.50 
8 34.46 30.83 174.57 190.00 0.62 0.62 0.00 0.49 
9 35.08 31.94 181.20 201.89 0.64 0.65 0.00 0.46 
10 35.72 33.05 188.06 213.78 0.66 0.67 0.00 0.43 
11 36.38 34.16 195.10 225.58 0.68 0.70 0.00 0.39 
12 37.05 35.24 202.33 237.19 0.70 0.73 0.00 0.34 
13 37.76 36.32 209.86 248.74 0.73 0.78 0.00 0.30 
14 38.49 37.39 217.72 260.20 0.76 0.81 0.00 0.25 
15 39.25 38.45 225.87 271.52 0.79 0.85 0.00 0.19 
16 40.04 39.49 234.32 282.70 0.82 0.89 0.00 0.14 
17 40.86 40.52 243.05 293.71 0.84 0.92 0.00 0.09 
18 41.70 41.54 252.05 304.59 0.87 0.96 0.00 0.05 
19 42.57 42.55 261.32 315.36 0.89 0.99 0.00 0.01 
20 43.46 43.55 270.86 326.06 0.92 1.03 0.02 0.00 
Source: Author 
 
Table 5.2 shows the results for investment, acres, private profits, and farmer welfare for 
all years. When SPG selects food edible traits, the growth in their acres increases to a relatively 
small amount of 98,425 acres. For the private market, roundup ready acres increase to 7.3 
million acres after 20 years of investment. Roundup ready acres gain most of the market share in 
this case even though food edible gross margins are higher. This is due to unappealing 
characteristics for food edible varieties such as marketability, high agronomic labor, disease 
resistance, and stress tolerance for geographic regions. This case relates more closely to the 
current scenario in western Canada where most public varieties are food edible and not 
substitutable with roundup ready soybeans. For case 1, the change in social welfare over 20 years 
is approximately one billion dollars. 
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Table 5.2: - Case 1. Low Substitutable - Investment, Acres, and Welfare Results for 20 
Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding  
Year 
SPG 
Investment 
(millions of $) 
Private 
Investment 
(millions of $) 
Other Crop 
Acres 
Soybean 
Acres 
Roundup 
Ready Acres 
Food Edible 
Acres 
Net Private 
Profits 
(millions of $) 
Farmer 
Welfare 
(millions of $) 
1 0.97 0.98 58,119,000 3,047,469 3,035,675 11,794 204.8  222.5  
2 1.03 1.03 57,962,524 3,203,945 3,188,520 15,425 215.1  239.0  
3 1.08 1.07 57,832,736 3,333,733 3,314,250 19,483 223.6  254.1  
4 1.13 1.11 57,697,098 3,469,371 3,445,746 23,625 232.4  270.0  
5 1.18 1.15 57,581,021 3,585,448 3,557,469 27,979 240.0  284.8  
6 1.23 1.19 57,458,559 3,707,910 3,675,686 32,224 248.0  300.5  
7 1.32 1.25 57,253,762 3,912,707 3,875,298 37,409 261.4  329.2  
8 1.43 1.32 57,024,206 4,142,263 4,099,697 42,566 276.6  361.9  
9 1.53 1.39 56,810,145 4,356,324 4,308,282 48,042 290.6  395.2  
10 1.64 1.47 56,573,683 4,592,786 4,539,493 53,292 306.2  432.5  
11 1.75 1.54 56,351,441 4,815,028 4,756,337 58,691 320.9  470.6  
12 1.87 1.61 56,107,971 5,058,498 4,994,792 63,706 336.9  512.8  
13 2.00 1.69 55,872,547 5,293,922 5,225,102 68,821 352.5  556.8  
14 2.14 1.77 55,610,759 5,555,710 5,482,175 73,535 369.8  606.4  
15 2.28 1.85 55,355,932 5,810,537 5,732,249 78,288 386.7  658.0  
16 2.44 1.94 55,074,396 6,092,073 6,009,473 82,600 405.4  715.8  
17 2.60 2.03 54,798,651 6,367,818 6,280,881 86,938 423.7  776.0  
18 2.78 2.12 54,495,631 6,670,838 6,579,990 90,848 443.9  843.1  
19 2.97 2.22 54,197,026 6,969,443 6,874,624 94,819 463.8  913.2  
20 3.17 2.32 53,870,090 7,296,379 7,197,954 98,425 485.6  990.9  
Source: Author 
5.3.2 Case 2 Results 
 In case 2, private market soybeans and SPG soybeans are moderately substitutable 
meaning that SPG selects a conventional trait that serves the same end-use market as biotech 
varieties (𝜆 = 0.5). However, we assume that conventional soybeans are inferior to private 
market roundup ready technology. 
In table 5.3, conventional yield surpasses roundup ready yield in year 19. Conventional 
gross margins exceed roundup ready gross margins in year six. These results are comparable to 
case 1 results. Interestingly, the yields and gross margins for both SPG and private soybeans are 
lower in case 2. This is due to increased competition lowering private profits and investment. 
In table 5.4, roundup ready acres increase to 4.9 million by year 20, whereas conventional 
acres increase to 1.5 million. The change in social welfare over 20 years is 770 million dollars, 
which is less than the result in case 1. In case 2, farmer welfare is also 120 million dollars lower 
than case 1 in year 20.  In the two-stage game, investing in moderately substitutable traits had the 
same impact on farmer welfare as less substitutable traits. This suggests that investing in 
conventional varieties when spillover effects exist reduce farmer welfare. 
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Table 5.3: Case 2. Moderately Substitutable - Yield, Gross Margins, Yield Growth Results 
for 20 Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding 
Year 
Roundup 
Ready Yield 
(bu/ac) 
Conventional 
Yield (bu/ac) 
Roundup 
Ready Gross 
Margin ($/ac) 
Conventional 
Gross Margin 
($/ac) 
Roundup 
Ready Yield 
Growth 
(bu/ac) 
Conventional 
Yield Growth 
(bu/ac) 
PV Spillover 
Yield Growth 
(bu/ac) 
SPG Spillover 
Yield Growth 
(bu/ac) 
1 31.80 24.36 146.13 120.76 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.57  
2 32.10 25.23 149.31 130.05 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.58  
3 32.39 26.10 152.49 139.40 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.56  
4 32.69 26.96 155.68 148.56 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.54  
5 32.99 27.80 158.86 157.54 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.52  
6 33.29 28.61 162.04 166.24 0.57 0.57 0.00  0.49  
7 33.86 29.67 168.16 177.55 0.59 0.60 0.00  0.48  
8 34.45 30.74 174.52 189.07 0.60 0.62 0.00  0.47  
9 35.05 31.83 180.95 200.65 0.61 0.64 0.00  0.44  
10 35.67 32.91 187.51 212.20 0.62 0.66 0.00  0.41  
11 36.28 33.97 194.11 223.63 0.63 0.68 0.00  0.37  
12 36.91 35.02 200.81 234.85 0.64 0.71 0.00  0.33  
13 37.55 36.06 207.64 245.96 0.66 0.75 0.00  0.28  
14 38.21 37.09 214.67 256.93 0.67 0.78 0.00  0.22  
15 38.87 38.09 221.82 267.68 0.69 0.82 0.00  0.17  
16 39.56 39.07 229.16 278.21 0.70 0.85 0.00  0.11  
17 40.26 40.03 236.61 288.47 0.71 0.88 0.00  0.05  
18 40.97 40.97 244.24 298.48 0.72 0.91 0.00  0.00  
19 41.69 41.88 251.99 308.24 0.74 0.94 0.03  0.00  
20 42.46 42.82 260.20 318.34 0.75 0.97 0.06  0.00  
Source: Author 
 
Table 5.4: - Case 2. Moderately Substitutable - Investment, Acres, and Welfare Results for 
20 Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding  
Year 
SPG 
Investment 
(millions of $) 
Private 
Investment 
(millions of $) 
Other Crop 
Acres 
Soybean 
Acres 
Roundup 
Ready Acres 
Conventional 
Acres 
Net Private 
Profits 
(millions of $) 
Farmer 
Welfare 
(millions of $) 
1 0.97 0.98 58,119,000 3,047,469 3,035,675 11,794 204.8  222.5  
2 1.03 1.02 57,962,524 3,203,945 3,161,360 42,584 213.3  238.8  
3 1.06 1.03 57,864,240 3,302,229 3,202,019 100,210 216.0  251.1  
4 1.11 1.06 57,746,020 3,420,449 3,271,489 148,961 220.7  265.7  
5 1.15 1.06 57,652,464 3,514,005 3,298,456 215,549 222.5  279.0  
6 1.19 1.08 57,543,486 3,622,983 3,352,298 270,686 226.1  294.1  
7 1.27 1.11 57,374,747 3,791,722 3,432,048 359,675 231.5  320.5  
8 1.36 1.15 57,179,017 3,987,452 3,550,102 437,351 239.5  351.1  
9 1.44 1.17 57,002,219 4,164,250 3,629,343 534,907 244.8  382.0  
10 1.54 1.21 56,805,634 4,360,835 3,742,371 618,463 252.5  416.5  
11 1.63 1.23 56,624,385 4,542,084 3,823,508 718,577 257.9  451.4  
12 1.73 1.27 56,427,755 4,738,714 3,935,762 802,952 265.5  489.4  
13 1.84 1.30 56,241,404 4,925,065 4,022,710 902,355 271.4  528.6  
14 1.95 1.34 56,039,474 5,126,995 4,140,758 986,237 279.3  571.1  
15 2.06 1.37 55,846,615 5,319,854 4,236,718 1,083,136 285.8  614.9  
16 2.18 1.41 55,640,613 5,525,856 4,362,059 1,163,797 294.3  661.7  
17 2.30 1.44 55,442,712 5,723,757 4,467,774 1,255,983 301.4  709.7  
18 2.43 1.49 55,233,255 5,933,214 4,601,233 1,331,981 310.4  760.7  
19 2.56 1.52 55,030,904 6,135,565 4,716,771 1,418,795 318.2  813.0  
20 2.70 1.57 54,808,746 6,357,723 4,862,676 1,495,046 328.0  870.6  
Source: Author 
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5.5.3 Case 3 Results 
 The simulation results for when SPG and private soybeans are highly substitutable are 
shown in tables 5.5 and 5.6. In this case, SPG invests in traits that are completely substitutable 
with private market soybeans (𝜆 = 1). This means that SPG invests in biotech traits but sells 
their seed at the conventional price. The effect of SPG increasing their price when they invest in 
biotech traits is later examined in the sensitivity analysis section. 
In table 5.5, when SPG invests in biotech traits their yield surpasses the private market’s 
yield in year 14. In case 3, the private market acquires yield gains from seed technology 
spillovers in year 14. When SPG has better seed technology, the private market benefits from 
technology spillovers. 
Table 5.5: Case 3. Highly Substitutable - Yield, Gross Margins, Yield Growth Results for 
20 Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding 
Year 
Roundup 
Ready Yield 
(bu/ac) 
SPG Biotech 
Yield (bu/ac) 
Roundup 
Ready Gross 
Margin ($/ac) 
SPG Biotech 
Gross Margin 
($/ac) 
Roundup 
Ready Yield 
Growth 
(bu/ac) 
SPG Biotech 
Yield Growth 
(bu/ac) 
PV Spillover 
Yield Growth 
(bu/ac) 
SPG Spillover 
Yield Growth 
(bu/ac) 
1 31.80 24.36 146.13 120.76 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.57  
2 32.10 25.23 149.31 130.05 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.56  
3 32.39 26.09 152.49 139.26 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.56  
4 32.69 26.95 155.68 148.45 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.56  
5 32.99 27.81 158.86 157.64 0.2974 0.2974 0.00  0.56  
6 33.29 28.66 162.04 166.81 0.57 0.57 0.00  0.56  
7 33.86 29.78 168.16 178.80 0.56 0.59 0.00  0.58  
8 34.41 30.95 174.11 191.30 0.54 0.62 0.00  0.58  
9 34.96 32.15 179.89 204.11 0.53 0.65 0.00  0.55  
10 35.49 33.35 185.56 216.98 0.52 0.69 0.00  0.49  
11 36.01 34.53 191.13 229.59 0.51 0.73 0.00  0.39  
12 36.52 35.65 196.63 241.58 0.53 0.80 0.00  0.26  
13 37.05 36.71 202.27 252.94 0.54 0.87 0.00  0.11  
14 37.59 37.70 208.04 263.45 0.55 0.94 0.01  0.00  
15 38.15 38.63 214.07 273.47 0.57 1.00 0.05  0.00  
16 38.77 39.64 220.70 284.22 0.58 1.07 0.10  0.00  
17 39.46 40.71 228.07 295.69 0.60 1.13 0.17  0.00  
18 40.23 41.84 236.32 307.82 0.63 1.19 0.24  0.00  
19 41.10 43.04 245.64 320.61 0.66 1.25 0.33  0.00  
20 42.09 44.29 256.22 333.98 0.69 1.30 0.43  0.00  
Source: Author 
In table 5.6, SPG investment is 6.64 million dollars in year 20. When varieties are highly 
substitutable, SPG biotech acres are greater than private acres increasing to 9.4 million acres. In 
year 20, roundup ready acres increase to 5.9 million. When SPG invests in biotech traits, the 
change in social welfare is over two billion dollars, which is the greatest out of all three 
investment cases. However, the increase in private profits is greater when SPG invests in food 
edible traits. This means that the private market’s incentive to invest in soybean breeding is 
reduced when SPG invests in biotech traits.  
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Table 5.6: - Case 3. Highly Substitutable - Investment, Acres, and Welfare Results for 20 
Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding  
Year 
SPG 
Investment 
(millions of $) 
Private 
Investment 
(millions of $) 
Other Crop 
Acres 
Soybean 
Acres 
Roundup 
Ready Acres 
SPG Biotech 
Acres 
Net Private 
Profits 
(millions of $) 
Farmer 
Welfare 
(millions of $) 
1 0.97 0.98 58,119,000 3,047,469 3,035,675 11,794 204.8  222.5  
2 1.01 0.95 57,962,524 3,203,945 2,943,641 260,304 198.6  236.7  
3 1.07 0.92 57,773,670 3,392,799 2,864,149 528,650 193.2  255.2  
4 1.13 0.91 57,553,439 3,613,030 2,807,410 805,620 189.4  278.3  
5 1.22 0.89 57,304,173 3,862,296 2,757,940 1,104,356 186.0  306.1  
6 1.31 0.88 57,026,400 4,140,069 2,727,313 1,412,756 184.0  338.8  
7 1.49 0.90 56,550,476 4,615,993 2,790,262 1,825,731 188.2  397.8  
8 1.69 0.92 56,024,428 5,142,041 2,860,568 2,281,473 193.0  467.2  
9 1.92 0.94 55,446,778 5,719,691 2,925,330 2,794,361 197.3  548.3  
10 2.18 0.97 54,821,888 6,344,581 3,009,915 3,334,666 203.0  641.0  
11 2.47 1.00 54,158,441 7,008,028 3,101,446 3,906,582 209.2  744.8  
12 2.77 1.04 53,474,043 7,692,426 3,225,265 4,467,161 217.6  856.7  
13 3.10 1.09 52,765,697 8,400,772 3,374,033 5,026,739 227.6  977.0  
14 3.43 1.15 52,052,759 9,113,710 3,569,946 5,543,764 240.8  1,101.6  
15 3.79 1.22 51,315,724 9,850,745 3,794,776 6,055,969 256.0  1,234.2  
16 4.20 1.31 50,483,875 10,682,594 4,071,818 6,610,776 274.7  1,388.8  
17 4.68 1.42 49,538,757 11,627,712 4,392,555 7,235,157 296.3  1,570.6  
18 5.23 1.55 48,471,546 12,694,923 4,800,129 7,894,793 323.8  1,782.3  
19 5.88 1.71 47,256,427 13,910,042 5,288,495 8,621,546 356.8  2,031.6  
20 6.64 1.91 45,881,405 15,285,064 5,915,944 9,369,120 399.1  2,322.4  
Source: Author 
5.3.4 Overview of Case Results, Elasticities and Net Present Value 
The results of the simulation model show that soybean acres in western Canada can be 
expected to grow by 3.31 to 12.23 million acres in 20 years when SPG and the private market 
both invest in soybean breeding. This growth rate is not unusual as lentil and pea acres in 
western Canada have grown by 5.33 million between 2006 and 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2017b). 
With improved maturity and the ability to seed soybeans in all soil zones, growth in soybean 
acres should be expected greater than lentils (where lentils are primarily grown on lighter and 
flatter land). 
Table 5.7 shows the own and cross acreage elasticities in year 10. Increasing the degree 
of substitutability lowers the cross acreage elasticity for private roundup ready soybeans with 
respect to SPG gross margins (eji), and increases the cross elasticity for SPG soybeans with 
respect to private gross margins (eij). When varieties are perfectly substitutable, this results in a 
proportional cross acreage change for SPG biotech and private roundup ready soybeans. This 
effect is achieved by changing the degree of substitutability (𝜆). The estimated elasticities for 
each case of substitutability are shown for years one and 19 in tables A.1 and A.2 in the 
appendix. 
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Table 5.7: Simulated Own and Cross Acreage Elasticities 
by Degree of Substitutability (DOS) in Year 10a 
Elasticity/DOS λ=0 λ=0.5 λ=1 
eii 2.695 3.46 3.49 
eji -0.0137 -0.389 -1.29 
eki -0.00144 -0.0121 -0.142 
    
eij -1.274 -0.716 -1.24 
ejj 1.303 1.221 4.11 
ekj -0.103 -0.0726 -0.15 
    
eik -1.02 -0.747 -1.53 
ejk -0.977 -0.838 -2.1 
ekk 0.0794 0.0634 0.21 
    
γii 669 10,063 53,559 
γji -219 -6,798 -17,884 
γki -450 -3,265 -35,675 
    
γij -362 -2,377 -19,058 
γjj 31,522 24,356 56,724 
γkj -31,160 -21,979 -37,666 
    
γik -450 -3,265 -35,676 
γjk -31,159 -21,979 -37,666 
γkk 31,609 25,244 73,342 
Source: Author 
a γ represents the change in acres with respect to a dollar increase in gross margins 
Table 5.8 shows the net present value of private profits, farmer welfare, and social 
welfare for each case. Social welfare is discounted at the social rate and accounts for both private 
profits and farmer welfare. In table 5.8, farmer and social welfare are greatest when SPG selects 
biotech traits. The net present value of private profits is lowest under high substitutes and 
greatest when SPG invests in food edible traits. Interestingly, these results are consistent with the 
two-stage game results where private benefits the most under low substitutability and farmers 
under high substitutability. 
Table 5.8: Simulation Results - Net Present Value of Private Profits, Farmer Welfare and 
Social Welfare for 20 Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding 
 Low Substitutes Moderate Substitutes High Substitutes 
Degree of Substitutability 0 0.5 1 
Private Profits (millions of $) 1,237 1,114 987.7 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 5,547 5,249 9,037 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 9,300 8,354 11,824 
Source: Author 
The results of the simulation show that the private market is not necessarily crowded out 
of the soybean market when varieties are high substitutes. However, the private market’s 
incentive to invest in breeding is lowered when SPG invests in biotech traits. The next section 
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conducts a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the model and examine how crowding 
effects are reduced when spillover effects do not exist and when SPG changes their price of seed 
and level of investment. 
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
5.4.0 Introduction 
The sensitivity analysis section checks the robustness of the simulation model by varying 
the own acreage elasticity for soybeans. This section also examines how crowding effects are 
reduced when no spillover effects exist for each case of substitutability. This is followed by 
examining the impact price and investment have on crowding effects and welfare. Lastly, a 
scenario in which SPG must pay for research as a percentage of their profits is examined. 
5.4.1 Acreage Elasticity Effects 
Because the acreage elasticity from Bakhshi and Gray (2012) is arbitrarily scaled, a 
robustness check on the elasticities is conducted. In table 5.9, raising the own acreage elasticity 
by one percentage point increases the growth in soybean acres dramatically. This is expected 
because the acreage elasticity quantifies the acreage response to an increase in the gross margins. 
In contrast, lowering the own acreage elasticity by one percentage point decreases the growth in 
soybean acres. 
Table 5.9: Simulated Parameters for 20 Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding by SPG 
and the Private Market with Acreage Elasticity Effects 
 Low Response Base Case High Response 
Acreage Elasticity 1.335 2.335 3.335 
Degree of Substitutability 1 1 1 
    
Parameter Value in Year 20:    
Private Yield (bu/ac) 41.30 42.09 44.82 
SPG Yield (bu/ac) 42.36 44.29 46.63 
Private Gross Margins ($/ac) 247.76 256.22 285.46 
SPG Gross Margins ($/ac) 313.40 333.98 359.09 
Private Reservation Price ($/ac) 349.54 358.00 387.24 
SPG Reservation Price ($/ac) 344.17 364.75 389.86 
        
Other Acres 54,288,225 45,881,405 18,661,929 
Soybean Acres 6,878,244 15,285,064 42,504,540 
Private Acres 3,683,806 5,915,944 18,449,372 
SPG Acres 3,194,438 9,369,120 24,055,168 
        
Private Profits (millions of $) 248.5 399 1,245 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 956.9 2,322 6,952 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 1,205 2,722 8,196 
    
Net Present Value:    
Private Profits (millions of $) 979.8 987.7 1,074 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 5,470 9,037 17,898 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 8,048 11,824 21,708 
Source: Author 
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5.4.2 Spillover Effects 
Spillover effects in the simulation give the lowest yielding variety yield gains from the 
better seed technology in the market. In the beginning years of the simulation, SPG obtains yield 
gains from the spillovers effects. However, as seen in the two-stage game, where there are no 
spillover effects, farmer welfare is greatest when SPG invests in biotech soybeans and the private 
market it crowded out. The two-stage game results are consistent in the simulation model. Table 
5.10 shows that when SPG invests in biotech traits, farmer welfare is greatest. When SPG invests 
in food edible traits, the net present value of private profits and social welfare are greatest. 
Table 5.10: Simulated Parameters for 20 Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding by 
SPG and the Private Market with no Spillover Effects 
  Low Substitutes Moderate Substitutes High Substitutes 
Degree of Substitutability 0 0.5 1 
    
Parameter Value in Year 20:    
Private Yield (bu/ac) 44.22 43.22 42.91 
SPG Yield (bu/ac) 37.32 36.53 37.20 
Private Gross Margins ($/ac) 279.07 268.30 264.98 
SPG Gross Margins ($/ac) 259.46 250.93 258.17 
Private Reservation Price ($/ac) 380.85 370.08 366.76 
SPG Reservation Price ($/ac) 290.23 281.70 288.94 
     
Other Acres 49,833,241 53,963,959 47,982,302 
Soybean Acres 11,333,228 7,202,510 13,184,167 
Private Acres 11,262,201 6,165,493 6,946,769 
SPG Acres 71,028 1,037,017 6,237,398 
     
Private Profits (millions of $) 759.7 415.9 468.6 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 1,581 957.2 1,726 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 2,340 1,373 2,194 
        
Net Present Value:    
Private Profits (millions of $) 1,336 1,203 1,168 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 6,933 5,468 7,086 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 11,481 9,013 10,587 
Source: Author 
These results show that the private market benefits when there are no spillover effects 
and SPG invests in food edible traits. If SPG does not want to deter private entry and reduce 
crowding effects, they could invest in biotech traits that have no spillover effects to reduce 
competition with the private market. This increases private profits and competition because SPG 
is unable to acquire yield gains from private market seed technology. 
5.3.3 Price Effects 
 If SPG were to invest in biotech traits, they would likely have to increase their seed price 
to cover the costs of a licensing agreement with a multinational company (i.e. Monsanto). This 
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section examines the price effects for when SPG invests in biotech traits and raises their price of 
seed. 
In the price effects scenario, gross margins are scaled to the base gross margins. This 
prevents the percentage change in gross margins from increasing and having a larger impact on 
the acreage elasticities. If not scaled to the base, SPG biotech acres would increase with higher 
seed prices as the percentage change in gross margins is higher for low gross margins. 
Table 5.11 shows the results for when SPG increases their price of seed. Notably, SPG 
acres decrease and private acres increase when SPG increases their price of seed. This is 
expected in our simulation model as higher prices reduce farmers’ incentive to purchase SPG 
soybeans. In table 5.11, the net present value of farmer welfare decreases with higher seed 
prices. The net present value of private profits is lowest when SPG prices their seed at 30.77 
dollars per acre, and highest at the monopolist price (101.78 dollars per acre). These results show 
that SPG can effectively reduce crowding effects by increasing their price of seed. 
Table 5.11: Simulated Parameters for 20 Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding by 
SPG and the Private Market with Price Effects and Scaled Percent Changes in SPG 
Gross Margins 
  Base Price Median Price Monopolist Price 
SPG Seed Price 30.77 67.28 101.78 
Percent Change Scaling Factor for 
SPG Gross Margins ($/ac) 
0 36.51 71.01 
Degree of Substitutability 1 1 1 
    
Parameter Value in Year 20:    
Private Yield (bu/ac) 42.09 42.40 42.61 
SPG Yield (bu/ac) 44.29 44.17 43.93 
Private Gross Margins ($/ac) 256.22 259.56 261.84 
SPG Gross Margins ($/ac) 333.98 296.25 259.11 
Private Reservation Price ($/ac) 358.00 361.34 363.62 
SPG Reservation Price ($/ac) 364.75 363.53 360.89 
     
Other Acres 45,881,405 47,062,508 49,221,622 
Soybean Acres 15,285,064 14,103,961 11,944,847 
Private Acres 5,915,944 6,279,308 6,238,893 
SPG Acres 9,369,120 7,824,654 5,705,954 
     
Private Profits (millions of $)  399.1 423.6 420.9 
SPG Profit (millions of $) - 285.7 405.2 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 2,322 1,974 1,556 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 2,722 2,683 2,382 
     
Net Present Value:    
Private Profits (millions of $) 987.7 1,032 1,079 
SPG Profits (millions of $) - 1,216 1,753 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 9,037 7,904 6,748 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 11,824 12,087 11,624 
Source: Author 
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5.3.4 Investment Effects 
Similar to the price effects scenario, investment effects are examined for when SPG 
invests in biotech traits. SPG can reduce their level of investment by lowering their checkoff levy 
percentage invested in breeding. In table 5.12, when SPG lowers their checkoff levy percentage 
invested in breeding, private soybean acres increase and SPG soybean acres decrease. However, 
for lower levels of investment, private profits and social welfare increase, while farmer welfare 
decreases. If SPG invests a 0.1 percent levy into soybean breeding, farmers are less likely to 
adopt SPG varieties, due to their low gross margins and yield. When SPG invests a 0.5 percent 
levy into breeding, their acres increase to 8.7 million, whereas private acres increase to 6 million.  
These results show that SPG can reduce crowding effects by lowering their level of investment 
in soybean breeding. However, investing only a small portion into breeding has a negative 
impact on farmer welfare. 
Table 5.12: Simulated Parameters for 20 Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding by 
SPG and the Private Market with Investment Effects 
  Base Levy Moderate Levy Small Levy 
SPG Checkoff Levy (%) 1.0 0.5 0.1 
Degree of Substitutability 1 1 1 
    
Parameter Value in Year 20:    
Private Yield (bu/ac) 42.09 42.57 43.69 
SPG Yield (bu/ac) 44.29 40.88 26.23 
Private Gross Margins ($/ac) 256.22 261.41 273.34 
SPG Gross Margins ($/ac) 333.98 297.50 140.78 
Private Reservation Price ($/ac) 358.00 363.19 375.12 
SPG Reservation Price ($/ac) 364.75 328.27 171.55 
     
Other Acres 45,881,405 46,480,725 48,933,532 
Soybean Acres 15,285,064 14,685,744 12,232,937 
Private Acres 5,915,944 6,011,715 11,749,417 
SPG Acres 9,369,120 8,674,029 483,520 
     
Private Profits (millions of $) 399 405.5 792.6 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 2,322 2,076 1,640 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 2,722 2,482 2,432 
        
Net Present Value:    
Private Profits (millions of $) 987.7 1,121 1,284 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 9,037 7,589 6,844 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 11,824 10,861 11,205 
Source: Author 
5.3.5 Price Effects with Cost of Investment for SPG  
In this scenario, SPG can only invest a percentage of their profits in soybean breeding, as 
oppose to investing their checkoff levy. SPG acquires profits by pricing their seed higher than 
the cost of selling seed.  
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Table 5.13 shows the results for when SPG pays for the cost of investment in breeding 
with five percent of their profits. When SPG prices seed low at 40.77 dollars per acre, their 
simulated acres in year 20 increase to 193,526. At this price, SPG’s level of investment in 
breeding is limited, which results in low yield growth and gross margins. SPG can acquire a 
sizeable market share by increasing their level of investment when they increase their price of 
seed to 67.28 dollars per acre. The net present value of farmer welfare and social welfare are 
greatest when SPG prices seed at the median price, as shown in table 5.13. When SPG has to pay 
for breeding with a percentage of their profits, the net present value of private profits increases 
under a lower SPG seed price. In this case, SPG invests more in breeding when setting price 
higher, however, the farmer welfare maximizing price is seemingly below the monopolistic 
price. 
Table 5.13: Simulated Parameters for 20 Years of Investment in Soybean Breeding by 
SPG and the Private Market with Price Effects and Investment Costs for SPG 
  Low Price Median Price Monopolist Price 
SPG Seed Price 40.77 67.28 101.78 
Percent Change Scaling Factor for SPG 
Gross Margins ($/ac) 
10.77 36.51 71.01 
Degree of Substitutability 1 1 1 
    
Parameter Value in Year 20:    
Private Yield (bu/ac) 43.73 43.81 46.00 
SPG Yield (bu/ac) 25.85 47.34 51.20 
Private Gross Margins ($/ac) 273.75 274.59 298.02 
SPG Gross Margins ($/ac) 126.67 330.15 336.96 
Private Reservation Price ($/ac) 375.53 376.37 399.80 
SPG Reservation Price ($/ac) 167.44 397.43 438.74 
     
Other Acres 48,811,165 43,039,204 44,026,894 
Soybean Acres 12,355,304 18,127,265 17,139,575 
Private Acres 12,161,778 6,827,954 7,871,230 
SPG Acres 193,526 11,299,311 9,268,345 
     
Private Profits (millions of $)  820.4 460.6 531 
SPG Profit (millions of $) 1.838 391.9 625.2 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 1,677 2,803 2,734 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 2,497 3,263 3,265 
     
Net Present Value:    
Private Profits (millions of $) 1,291 1,137 1,129 
SPG Profits (millions of $) 32.12 1,214 2,147 
Farmer Welfare (millions of $) 6,877 9,033  8,601 
Social Welfare (millions of $) 11,279 12,288 11,882 
Source: Author 
The results of this section show that the private market is less likely to be crowded out 
when SPG does not use checkoff levies to fund soybean breeding. However, this scenario 
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assumes that SPG can invest more than the checkoff amount. If SPG invests more in checkoff 
levies as opposed to profits, farmer welfare would be greatest when investing levies. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The results of the simulation show that there is a large amount of economic surplus to be 
gained when SPG and the private market invest in soybean breeding in western Canada. 
Importantly, the simulation shows that investment in breeding has a large positive impact on 
stimulating soybean adoption in western Canada. The increase in the soybean genetic yield index 
increases the gross margins index for soybeans, soybean acres grown, and farmer welfare. These 
results suggest that there are incentives for private investment in soybean breeding, even when 
SPG competes and invests in biotech soybeans. Given the size of the soybean market, SPG’s 
investment in soybean breeding captures a sizable portion of the market that would otherwise be 
allocated to other crops with lower returns. The simulation model shows that farmers benefit the 
most when SPG invests in biotech traits, prices at a royalty free rate, and invests competitively. 
In this case, farmer welfare increases by 2 billion dollars or 170 dollars per acre from 20 years of 
investment in soybean breeding. However, this reduces private profits, which could potentially 
deter private entry in soybean breeding. The simulation shows that SPG can reduce crowding 
effects by limiting investment, pricing non-competitively, or selecting traits that are not 
substitutable with private market varieties. These results are both shown in figure 5.2 and table 
5.14. 
Figure 5.2 shows the rents in year 20 for all cases and scenarios in the simulation. These 
results show that farmer welfare in year 20 is greatest when varieties are close substitutes, and 
when SPG prices and invests competitively. However, this lowers the private market profits in 
year 20 and lowers the private market’s incentive to invest in soybean breeding  
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Figure 5.2: Simulation Results and Sensitivity Analysis for Private Profits, SPG Profits, 
Farmer Welfare and Social Welfare after 20 years of investment in soybean breeding in 
western Canada 
 
Source: Author 
Table 5.14 shows simulation results for the Net Present Value (NPV) of private profits, 
SPG profits, farmer welfare, and social welfare. Similarly, SPG maximizes the NPV of farmer 
welfare when they invest in biotech traits, and when they price and invest competitively.  
The results in figure 5.1 and table 5.14 are relatively consistent and show that when SPG 
maximizes farmer welfare, they negatively impact the private market. Assuming SPG does not 
want to reduce private market involvement in soybean breeding, they can reduce crowding 
effects by increasing their price of seed, lowering their level of investment, and selecting traits 
that are less substitutable with private market soybean varieties. 
The next chapter provides the general summary and conclusions for the thesis findings, 
some research limitations, and further research. 
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Table 5.14: Simulation and Sensitivity Analysis Net Present Value (NPV) Welfare 
Results 
Scenario/NPV Private Profits SPG Profits Farmer Welfare Social Welfare 
  (millions of $) 
Substitutability Effects:         
Low Substitutes (𝜆 = 0) 1,237 - 5,547 9,300 
Moderate Substitutes (𝜆 = 0.5) 1,114 - 5,249 8,354 
High Substitutes (𝜆 = 1) 987.7 - 9,037 11,824 
          
Acreage Elasticity Effects:         
Low Response (𝑒 = 1.335) 979.8 - 5,470 8,048 
Base Case (𝑒 = 2.335) 987.7 - 9,037 11,824 
High Response (𝑒 = 3.335) 1,074 - 17,898 21,708 
          
Substitutability Effects without Spillovers:         
Low Substitutes (𝜆 = 0) 1,336 - 6,933 11,481 
Moderate Substitutes (𝜆 = 0.5) 1,203 - 5,468 9,013 
High Substitutes (𝜆 = 1) 1,168 - 7,086 10,587 
          
Price Effects:         
Base Price (𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺 = 30.77) 987.7 - 9,037 11,824 
Median Price (𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺 = 67.28) 1,032 1,216 7,904 12,087 
Monopolist Price (𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺 = 101.78) 1,079 1,753 6,748 11,624 
          
Investment Effects:         
Base Levy (1%) 987.7 - 9,037 11,824 
Moderate Levy (0.5%) 1,121 - 7,589 10,861 
Small Levy (0.1%) 1,284 - 6,844 11,205 
          
Price Effects with Investment Costs for SPG:       
Low Price (𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺 = 40.77) 1,291 32.12 6,877 11,279 
Median Price (𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺 = 67.28) 1,137 1,214 9,033 12,288 
Monopolist Price (𝑝𝑆𝑃𝐺 = 101.78) 1,129 2,147 8,601 11,882 
Source: Author's Estimates 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.0 Thesis Summary 
In summary, the thesis findings explain that SPG’s investment in soybean breeding 
benefits farmers where SPG strategically selects traits, pricing, and investment. In western 
Canada, current soybean breeding investment is set aside by SPG and the private market. By not 
investing in soybean breeding, economic growth and potential yield gains are foregone.  
As a producer-controlled organization, SPG’s goal is to invest in research projects that 
maximize their grower’s welfare. General results in this thesis show that investing in soybean 
breeding program would achieve that goal. However, there is a danger that SPG could crowd out 
the private market when investing in a soybean breeding program, due to ex post opportunistic 
behavior. Because private involvement is important to the provincial government, and SPG’s 
operations are delegated by the government, investment decisions for SPG may be limited to 
strategies that do not interfere with private development. Results from all three models show that 
SPG has the potential to crowd out the private market under higher competition. SPG can 
mitigate these risks by selecting investment strategies and reducing competition with the private 
sector. 
The results of thesis can be summarized by the results of each model presented in 
Chapters 3 to 5. In Chapter 3, the extensive form game shows that SPG entry in soybean 
breeding could prevent a holdup problem in western Canada by reducing ex post opportunistic 
behavior. The extensive form game also shows that crowding out is reduced when SPG invests in 
soybeans that provides research spillovers and increase the private firm’s payoff. 
 In Chapter 4, the two-stage game uses two modelling environments to examine how the 
degree of substitutability and the difference in the level of existing seed technology crowd out 
the private firm. The results from the Simultaneous Research game show that when the degree of 
substitutability is high (SPG invests in biotech traits) and has competitive existing seed 
technology, the private firm is crowded out. However, when SPG has uncompetitive existing 
seed technology, they are better off not investing in a soybean breeding program. SPG can 
reduce crowding effects by selecting food edible traits that are less substitutable with private 
varieties. The SPG Led Stackelberg game shows that SPG does not reduce crowding effects 
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when they are the first to invest in soybean breeding. However, in both models, SPG can reduce 
crowding effects by selecting traits that are less substitutable with private firm soybeans. 
 In Chapter 5, the simulation model provided a full comprehensive analysis by quantifying 
the effects of investment using data on prices, acres, yield, costs, and acreage elasticities. The 
simulation derived own and cross acreage elasticities from the multi-output producer surplus 
function. The results from the simulation show that when SPG invests in biotech traits, they 
reduce private profits and deter entry. SPG can reduce crowding effects by investing in food 
edible traits, selecting traits that do not receive technology spillovers from the private market, 
increasing their price of seed, or lowering their level of investment. When SPG invests in a 
biotech soybean breeding program, the net present value of farmer welfare is approximately 9.04 
billion dollars. If the private market invests, and SPG invests in non-substitutable varieties (such 
as food-edible), the net present value of farmer welfare reduces to 5.55 billion dollars. For all 
degrees of substitutability, the change in the net present value of private profits ranges between 
988 to 1,237 million dollars.2 
6.0.0 Policy Implications 
In all three models presented in this thesis, SPG’s decision to invest in soybean breeding 
depends much on the degree of substitutability and level of competition with the private market. 
These investment decisions are explained through the respective model and separated into policy 
implications. The three investment decisions are: 
1. Invest in Biotech Traits with Large Research Spillovers. The extensive form 
game shows that economic surplus in the future is reduced when SPG does not 
invest in a soybean breeding program. However, SPG has the potential to crowd 
out the private market when choosing to invest. SPG can reduce crowding effects 
by providing large research spillovers that benefit the private sector. 
2. Invest in Food Edible Traits. The two-stage game and simulation model show 
that when SPG invests in food edible traits, farmer welfare increases primarily in 
the private market. This decision still benefits farmers as private investment is not 
deterred. 
                                                          
2 The net present value of private profits are 988 million dollars when SPG selects biotech traits and 1,237 million when SPG 
selects food edible traits. 
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3. Invest in Biotech Traits with a Moderate Price of Seed and Level of 
Investment. In the two-stage game and simulation model, farmer welfare is 
greatest when SPG invests in biotech soybeans, but this reduces private profits 
and deters private entry. The simulation model shows that SPG can reduce 
crowding effects by increasing their price of seed and/or lowering their level of 
investment in soybean breeding. 
6.1 Limitations of Research and Further Research 
6.1.0 Research Limitations 
The major limitations in this thesis are mainly present in the two-stage game and 
simulation model. Starting with the two-stage game, using a quadratic production function was a 
research limitation. In many cases, the degree of substitutability could be parameterized using 
the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function. Other production functions 
could have been used to model the two-stage game, such as the translog production function. 
However, these functions do not result in a linear demand system, which increases the 
complexity of the theoretical model. In the two-stage game, we did not explore research 
spillovers, joint ventures, or private subsidies, which is a large research limitation. These 
excluded factors could have been used to attract private investment in the theoretical model. 
In the simulation model, a large research limitation was not being able to acquire data on 
the acreage elasticities in western Canada. The elasticities from Saskatchewan peas were used as 
a proxy, however, the true value of the acreage elasticity could be very different. The within-
group assumption was also a research limitation, which imposed severe restrictions on the 
simulated elasticities. There could be several methods to estimate the elasticities. However, these 
methods were out of the scope of my thesis and would potentially require an additional chapter. 
Another research limitation in the simulation model was defining spillover effects in plant 
breeding as convergence rates. Spillover effects are usually measured as stock variables that 
accumulate over time to provide higher technological growth. Changing the functional form for 
the spillover effects could have a substantial impact on the simulation results. 
6.1.1 Further Research 
Further research in the two-stage game includes incorporating spillover effects. This 
would be a challenging endeavor as spillover effects increase the complexity of the two-stage 
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game. In terms of modeling, one could further the investment analysis by examining how pricing 
of seed impacts welfare in a Hotelling’s Model when location is endogenous and represents 
product differentiation by trait selection.   
Further research in the simulation model includes examining the impact of implementing 
an End Point Royalty (EPR) system in the pulse sector in western Canada. EPRs are a percentage 
fee on the sale of production that farmers pay to breeders for seed technology. EPRs mitigate the 
negative effects of brown-bagging through enforcing royalty collection at the end of the supply 
chain. The impact EPRs have on welfare can be modeled in the simulation as an increase in the 
price of seed. The impact of increasing the price of seed, as shown in the simulation model, 
reduces farmer welfare and increases private profits. EPRs may have the potential to increase 
private profits, which would incentivize innovation and entry in plant breeding. In the long-run, 
this could increase farmer welfare through a higher level of investment in breeding and higher 
yield growth in the pulse sector. Whether EPRs benefit both farmers and plant breeders, when 
compared to other value creation models, is unknown and needs further examination.  
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Appendix 
The appendix shows the calculated own and cross acreage elasticities in year 1 and 19. 
The calculated elasticities for each case in year 1 are shown in table A.1. In table A.1, elasticities 
that change with the degree of substitutability are the SPG own elasticity and the cross 
elasticities between soybean varieties. Table A.2 shows the calculated elasticities for each case in 
year 19. 
 
Table A.1: Estimated Own and Cross Acreage 
Elasticities by Degree of Substitutability (DOS) in 
Year 1 of Simulation 
Elasticity/DOS λ=0 λ=0.5 λ=1 
eii 4.66 34.58 274.4 
eji -0.00903 -0.125 -1.06 
eki -0.000473 -0.000473 -0.000473 
       
eij -2.33 -2.26 -1.73 
ejj 2.34 2.34 2.34 
ekj -0.122 -0.122 -0.122 
       
eik -2.75 -2.75 -2.75 
ejk -2.28 -2.28 -2.28 
ekk 0.119 0.119 0.119 
       
γii 454 3,369 26,733 
γji -226 -3,141 -25,508 
γki -228 -228 -228 
       
γij -189 -185 -157 
γjj 48,695 48,691 48,663 
γkj -48,506 -48,506 -48,506 
       
γik -228 -228 -228 
γjk -48,506 -48,506 -48,506 
γkk 48,734 48,734 48,734 
Source: Author 
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Table A.2: Estimated Own and Cross Acreage 
Elasticities by Degree of Substitutability (DOS) in 
Year 19 of Simulation 
Elasticity/DOS λ=0 λ=0.5 λ=1 
eii 2.48 2.37 3.15 
eji -0.0144 -0.379 -1.31 
eki -0.00252 -0.0286 -0.428 
       
eij -1.27 -0.731 -1.07 
ejj 1.3 1.33 4.03 
ekj -0.163 -0.095 -0.262 
       
eik -0.651 -0.513 -1.04 
ejk 2.36 -0.627 -1.36 
ekk 0.301 0.067 0.342 
       
γii -461 10,898 84,528 
γji -361 -5,790 -21,581 
γki -386 -5,108 -62,947 
       
γij -461 -4,116 -36,235 
γjj 34,284 24,886 86,630 
γkj -33,823 -20,770 -50,395 
       
γik -386 -5,108 -62,947 
γjk -33,823 -20,770 -50,395 
γkk 34,209 25,878 113,342 
Source: Author 
 
